



Essential Histories

The Jacobite Rebellion 1745–46

Gregory Fremont-Barnes

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INTRODUCTION

The Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 represents both a tragic episode in Scottish history and the greatest crisis to threaten British internal security in the 18th century. At once bold and brilliant, and marked by the leadership of the young, adventurous ‘Bonnie Prince Charlie’, the rebellion sought to restore the Stuart dynasty to the British throne, placing its principal hopes for success on those somewhat improbably romantic icons, the Highland clans, whose very way of life changed forever with the disaster at Culloden, the culminating battle of the rebellion.

Seen as a whole, the events of 1745–46 reveal a period of brief Jacobite triumph followed by a slow and inevitable decline, of a cause struggling against the tide of history. When James II died in 1701, those committed to the restoration of the Stuarts naturally transferred their loyalties to his son, James Edward Stuart and, later, to his son, Charles Edward. But unless Charles’ adherents could persuade their fellow countrymen – not merely in Scotland but across Britain generally – that their claimant had no intention to re-establish the arbitrary powers once exercised by his grandfather, James II – powers stripped from him as a result of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688–89 – the prospect of a Stuart Restoration remained remote, if not impossible.

The Jacobite struggle is aptly named – as a rebellion, not a revolution or a civil war – for the movement sought to change the sovereign of a state, not to overturn its political system altogether, and it did not involve the great mass of the population in the manner so characteristic of revolutionary movements. While it centred on Scotland, it sought, though in fact drew relatively little, support from across the British Isles, and thus never deteriorated into a large-scale civil or internecine conflict. Its span as a political movement,

OPPOSITE

Prince Charles Edward Stuart, 1720–88, the eldest son of Prince James Francis Edward Stuart. (Photo by National Galleries of Scotland/Getty Images)

influenced by religious prejudices and manifesting itself in arms three times in the course of 60 years, traced its origins to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 when the Protestant King William III of the Netherlands deposed James II of England and effectively ended in 1746 with the collapse of the Jacobite cause at Culloden – notwithstanding the spate of insignificant conspiracies and cabals which followed over the succeeding generation.

The name ‘Jacobite’ derives from the Latin *Jacobus*, for James, referring to those who supported the cause of James II. Only in this respect does it satisfy a single definition, for it very rapidly assumed various associations, not least with Roman Catholicism and specifically the Highland Scots’ adherence to the House of Stuart. Having said this, Jacobites were never exclusively Catholic – Protestant and Catholic Jacobites served the cause in both the risings of 1715 and 1745; nor was the movement confined to Scotland or peculiar to the Highlands. True, this rather amorphous concept has become most closely associated with the Scottish Highlands, for this was the key source of its military support, but the phenomenon also existed to a great extent on the Continent, particularly amongst émigré Scots and Irish, as well as in Ireland and in parts of England, particularly in the North, the West Country and in London.

The appeal of the ’45 is more than obvious. This conflict of David and Goliath proportions, fought over a

OPPOSITE

The Jacobites at Prestonpans. Although a high point of their campaign, success required more than one or two tactical victories. (Chronicle / Alamy Stock Photo)





virtually hopeless cause, has manifested itself in an almost mournful admiration of the underdog – the Highland clans, dressed in their characteristic garb and armed with weapons peculiar to their region, flocking to the banner of their exiled prince. All struggles between a people conceived of as semi-civilized and those of a more advanced society carry with them an element of pathos, not least when they hail from forbidding, isolated lands whose barren mountains, rugged sea coasts and remote islands forbade extensive exploration, much less development. The Highlanders, living apart from what even their Lowland cousins regarded as civilization, distinguished themselves not merely by geography but by distinctive dress, language and tribal custom, and they pursued an existence seemingly beyond the reach of established religion, to say nothing of external political authority. To many they seemed the barbaric remains of Scotland's medieval past, their way of life punctuated by military prowess, a hostile temperament and generational feuds; in short, an aberration in an era of progressive thought, technology and science inaugurated by the Enlightenment.

On the other hand, the Highland clansmen were not a race of noble savages, taken advantage of by the ambitions of the Stuarts and trampled underfoot by the forces of progress and modernity. For many chiefs, the slow movement for change threatened the clan system, and by adhering to the Stuart cause they sought to prolong their power base and the cultural system on which it rested. In truth, if the Stuarts found them a useful ally in pursuing their ends, equally the Highlanders used the Prince as a means of preserving a way of life perceived to be under threat.

Thus, study of the Jacobite Rebellion would scarcely command the interest that it enjoys stripped of its fascinating association with this remarkable people – unquestionably more feared than admired by their contemporaries and trapped in a bygone era – who violently eschewed the social and political changes well underway to the south.



BACKGROUND TO WAR

The roots of Jacobitism

The origins of the Jacobite movement may be traced to the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89, when James VII of Scotland (James II of England) abdicated in favour of William of Orange as King of Great Britain. James ruled as a Catholic over a predominantly Protestant country, which – although always likely to be problematic – proved particularly unpopular while simultaneously in France, religious persecution of Protestants reached a high point. The Catholic king also alienated many of his subjects by extending preferential treatment to his co-religionists, and drove an otherwise religiously tolerant 17th-century society to its limits by allowing not only Catholics but also Dissenters to hold public office. Adding political controversy to his religious problems, in an effort to influence the Parliamentary elections of 1688 he disenfranchised those municipal organizations and other local representative bodies which had previously exercised the power to elect members of the House of Commons.

Matters reached a head in the summer of that year when the queen had a son, James Edward Stuart, whom it was naturally assumed would be raised a Catholic. Prominent politicians decided to act, inviting William of Orange, unswervingly Protestant and an enemy of the French, to assume the throne of Great Britain. Though William was



A lost cause – James II of England & VII of Scotland leaves for exile in France after the battle of the Boyne in July 1690. (Photo by The Print Collector/Getty Images)

a foreigner, sound reasons existed for the choice, since he was not only the king's nephew but also his son-in-law, as a consequence of his marriage to Mary, James's daughter. William's supporters hoped this might influence James to alter his policies, though it did not escape them that the Dutch king might accept their proposal as a cynical ploy to depose James, whose friendship with Louis XIV of France naturally caused great concern in Britain. From William's perspective, his dual control of both Britain and the Netherlands would bolster the independence of his homeland, by enabling him to lead a grand coalition against France and stymie Louis' imperial designs. The political and religious rights of people in Britain were therefore hardly foremost in William's calculations; rather, he arrived in England in November 1688 at the head of

14,000 men with the intention of creating a barrier to French territorial ambitions.

James did not lack the personal resolve to resist an invasion, but widespread defections from his army, notably including prominent officers like John Churchill, the future Duke of Marlborough, deprived him of the support necessary to retain his throne in England. Revolts rapidly sprang up across the country in support of William. James tried to negotiate but failed to make progress, whereupon he fled to France in December 1688 and sought the protection of Louis XIV.

With William now ensconced in power, Parliamentary elections took place in England in January 1689. This body passed the Declaration of Rights, which set limits to monarchical rule whereby the king could no longer rule absolutely in the manner of his predecessor. In short, the exercise of power now depended on the consent of a freely elected legislature, which could limit the king's prerogative respecting such issues as the suspension of law, the levying of taxation and the maintenance of a standing army in peacetime. To these restrictions William willingly consented when he assumed the throne as king (with his wife Mary as queen). In the event, the king's subsequent relationship with Parliament assumed a difficult aspect, for he often tested the boundaries of his authority, which at times extended to the realms of arbitrary rule so characteristic of the previous reign. While Parliament had no wish to relinquish its new-found rights and staunchly resisted the extension of royal power, this political wrangling never reached an intensity sufficient to unleash a strong Jacobite reaction in England until well after William's death; not, in fact, until the accession of George I in 1714.

In Ireland, however, William faced a direct threat when in March 1689 James landed and received immediate local support from Richard Talbot, the Earl of Tyrconnell, who had continued to administer the country as Lord Deputy in James's stead, William not having gained full control over the island. Thus, Ireland, a country divided by religion owing to the settlement of Protestant Lowland

Scots in Ulster over the previous hundred years, became a battleground between William and James. It reached a crescendo at the battle of the Boyne in July 1690, though this by no means marked the end of the conflict in Ulster, which continued for another year.

The terms of the Treaty of Limerick, which ended the war in 1691, allowed thousands of Irish Catholics in James's army to go into exile. Most of these were native Irishmen, with many officers from the Catholic gentry who could trace their origins to the era before Protestants established the plantations in the north. Others who served James were of English stock, their forebears having settled in Ireland centuries before. Not content to remain in an Ireland under a Protestant Ascendancy, they chose instead to enter the army of Louis XIV, forming a unit of exiles called the Irish Brigade. Many such exiles settled in other Catholic countries in Europe, establishing themselves in trade and business. Together with English and many Scottish Catholic exiles, they constituted a large community of Jacobite supporters in Europe. Disparate but by no means inconsequential, they would survive as a political force into the mid-18th century and help keep alive the flame of Jacobitism. Of all James' supporters, however, the Jacobite community in Scotland remained the most important to his hope of regaining the crown.

Nevertheless, circumstances in Scotland bore little resemblance to those in Ireland and on the Continent, for many Scots accused James of abusing his position as king, exercising power in an arbitrary manner and subverting the constitutional rights of his people. A stern reaction followed: Catholics were barred from public office, and the episcopacy was condemned. In the winter of 1688–89, 200 Episcopalian ministers – many, but by no means all, Jacobite sympathizers – were forcibly expelled from their positions, mostly in the Presbyterian stronghold of the south-west. More clergy refused to withdraw their oaths of allegiance to James in favour of William and Mary; they too were expelled, becoming known as 'non-juring' Episcopalians. Despite this persecution, the Episcopalian Church maintained support across the



Highlands, particularly among the clans in the north-east of the country, whereas Presbyterianism was largely limited to a few clans like the Campbells, headed by the Earls of Argyll, and the Gordons, under the Earls of Sutherland.

In the summer of 1690 William reluctantly restored Presbyterian government to the national Church, on the basis that the Scots Parliament would otherwise refuse him the funds he desperately required to wage the war which had broken out with France the previous year, and which had resulted in the failed French expedition to Ireland in support of James. A meeting of the Church's General Assembly took place in October 1690, but only 180 ministers and elders attended (although almost 1,000 parishes existed in Scotland). These were mostly from the Lowlands, and included many who had lost their positions in the 1660s during the reign of Charles II

Irish troops departing Limerick for France in 1692 in the wake of William III's defeat of Irish Jacobite forces. (Photo by Print Collector/ Getty Images)

for refusing to accept the Episcopalian Church. The Assembly effectively began the purge of Episcopalianism – a process which in the end took decades – while in the meantime Presbyterianism survived quite strongly in the Scottish Lowlands, with qualified support offered first to William, then Queen Anne and later the Hanoverian line. At the same time, Episcopalianism carried on in the north of Scotland, adhered to not only by the Highland clans but also in some areas of the Lowlands, such as those in the north-east around Aberdeen.

The Jacobites were almost entirely committed Episcopalians, with the remainder belonging to the minority Catholic community, and their cause came to be associated with the non-juring Episcopalians. Quite apart from their religious sensibilities, it was on a purely political level that the great majority of Episcopalians adhered to the Jacobite cause, persuaded as they were that the Stuarts were entitled to rule Scotland by divine right. On this basis, therefore, the country stood divided, with potential conflict ever present.

When William and Mary ascended the throne, the principal Scottish political figures largely accepted the situation, although John Graham of Claverhouse, whom James II & VII had created Viscount Dundee, refused to recognize the new sovereign and led a revolt on behalf of the deposed Scottish king in April 1689. It was to be the first of three Jacobite revolts, and began a few weeks after James had landed in Ireland. He achieved initial success at the battle of Killiecrankie on 27 July, but he was killed there, and without his exceptional leadership the rebellion began to founder, though ultimate defeat did not occur until the decisive battle of Cromdale on 1 May 1690.

In an attempt to pacify the Jacobite clans, John Campbell of Glenorchy, first Earl of Breadalbane, ordered the clan chiefs to submit to the government, or face outlawing. But the clan chiefs insisted their submission would not be forthcoming until the exiled James, residing in France, gave his consent. After months of delay, this consent arrived just before the expiration of the government's deadline of 31 December 1691. Alasdair

Maclain, the chief of the MacDonalds of Glencoe, was unable to formally submit before the deadline, and Sir John Dalrymple of Stair, the Secretary of State for Scotland and a rival of Breadalbane, used the delay as a pretext for launching a punitive expedition against the clan.

The troops who would conduct what became known as the Glencoe Massacre consisted of Campbell soldiers from the Duke of Argyll's Regiment – a clan loyal to the government, but also long-standing rivals of the MacDonalds – to give the appearance of an act of revenge against a rival clan. Yet this was not the case. Dalrymple, who had served under James II & VII, was motivated by a desire to demonstrate his loyalty to the new sovereign and, in any event, deeply despised the Highland clans. The Glencoe Massacre served Jacobite propaganda well, for across the country the public were horrified by the atrocity and William had signed the orders that authorized it. The enquiry that followed proved a whitewash, with the king seeking to protect himself from implication, leaving Dalrymple to take the blame and resign from office.

Although the Jacobite cause would derive most of its strength from its Scottish supporters, and the image of the 1745 Rebellion is indelibly that of a Highland revolt, in 17th- and 18th-century Scotland the allegiances of the clans were divided between Hanoverian and Jacobite, their loyalties driven by politics, economics and religion. Those clans which adhered to religious faiths considered suspect by dint of their ostensible connection with Jacobitism; those which rejected the Hanoverians as upstarts bent on breaking the traditional feudal ties of Highland life; those who rejected the Act of Union or who for any of a host of reasons looked to the House of Stuart as their true sovereign – these clans almost inevitably supported the Jacobite cause either overtly by supplying troops and funds, or by their refusal to aid government efforts at suppressing it. Those clans, Highland and Lowland, which viewed the government and Crown in London as the essential bedrock upon which rested their authority, economic livelihoods and

Massacre of Glencoe, February 1692, when troops under the Earl of Argyll treacherously slaughtered members of the MacDonald clan. (Photo by: Peter Barritt/Avalon/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)



political futures within a united kingdom, naturally sided with the Hanoverian establishment.

Conflict with France was also destined to affect Scottish affairs, for when the Nine Years' War was ended in 1697 by the Treaty of Ryswyck, Louis XIV recognized William as King of Great Britain, and so ended for the moment the possibility of French help for James's restoration. Nevertheless the chance of a peaceful Stuart restoration was less remote than circumstances suggested. William offered the throne to James II & VII's son, James Edward



Stuart, his recognized heir, so long as William could continue to rule without interference until his death and so long as the exiled king would raise James Edward a Protestant. As James adamantly refused to consider this proposition, the throne would by right pass to Princess Anne, the younger sister of William's wife, Mary. William offered the same terms again in 1700, after the death of Anne's last surviving son, but James again refused.

Thereafter no Catholic claimant could reach the throne, for in 1701 the English Parliament passed the Act



of Settlement, restricting the sovereign to Protestantism in general, and Anglicanism in particular. The Act abolished the rights of all 57 claimants to the throne who were descended by whatever connection to James VI of Scotland. Instead, in the likely event that William and Princess Anne died without heirs, it guaranteed the succession to a granddaughter of James: Sophia, Electress of Hanover, and her descendants. This proved the case, and thus by this Act, following Anne's reign (1702–14), Sophia's son George, Elector of Hanover, became King of Great Britain as George I, so inaugurating the Hanoverian line that reigned on the British throne until Victoria's accession in 1837. Significantly, the English Parliament passed this legislation without any discussion with its Scottish counterpart – which had itself proposed nothing of the kind – thereby generating considerable ill-feeling over a matter with far-reaching constitutional implications.

Further rebuffs and offence to the Scots Parliament occurred in 1702, when the English Parliament declared war on France without any consultation with its counterpart in Edinburgh. This new conflict, the War of the Spanish Succession, was an international power struggle resulting from the absence of a Bourbon heir on the death of Charles II of Spain in 1700, and pitted a Protestant alliance consisting of Britain, the Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire (a loose-knit body of western and central German states) against Catholic France and Spain. The year previously James II & VII had died, and so by this point James Francis Edward Stuart, later to become known as the 'Old Pretender', had already succeeded him as Stuart claimant to the throne.

The Act of Settlement contributed strongly to the series of events which led to the Act of Union between England and Scotland, which elicited no small degree of resentment amongst the Scottish populace and, above all, the Jacobites. Determined not to concede its ancient rights, in 1703 the Scots Parliament passed the Act of Security, under the terms of which the Hanoverian line were only to be entitled to the Crown of Scotland if the Westminster Parliament recognized the sovereignty of

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John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, who in November 1715 fought an indecisive action against Jacobite forces at Sheriffmuir. (Photo by: Sepia Times/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

Queen Anne, daughter of James II, whom William of Orange deposed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. In 1702 she succeeded to the throne as the last Stuart monarch. (Photo by The Print Collector/Getty Images)



the Parliament in Edinburgh. In fact, the Act specifically guaranteed the sovereignty of the crown and kingdom of Scotland, the independence of its Parliament, its religion, and the protection of the country's trade from English influence. The Act also required all Protestant men old enough to serve in the militia to receive training in defence of the kingdom, which implied that Scotland was prepared to fight against English encroachments on its liberties. A further Act stipulated that whoever succeeded Queen Anne could not declare war without in the first instance consulting the Scots Parliament.

The English Parliament took umbrage at this expression of defiance and recommended that the Queen order troops to the border, that the militia be called out in the northern counties of England and further troops sent to Carlisle, Berwick and Newcastle – all within easy striking distance of Scotland. Anglo-Scottish relations deteriorated further

in February 1705 when Westminster passed the Alien Act, which demanded that by Christmas of that year the Scots Parliament repeal the 1703 Act of Security – thereby accepting the Hanoverian succession unconditionally – or enter discussions for the union of the respective countries' Parliaments. Failing this, all Scots living outside of England would be regarded as foreigners and all Scottish imports refused entry across the border. This economic threat proved grave indeed, for the principal landowners in Scotland, far beyond merely the nobility alone, depended heavily upon the export of their coal, cattle and linen to England. To them, union with England appeared to be at the very least an economic necessity, for without access to England's colonial trade, much of it managed by the monopolistic East India Company, Scotland's prosperity would suffer. There seemed virtually no prospect of Scotland carving out an empire or colonial markets of its own after a disastrous attempt to settle a colony in Central America had failed in 1698.

The Scots Parliament naturally debated the Act of Union, but the commissioners appointed to do so were nominated by Queen Anne, and thus enjoyed little credibility among Scots. Nevertheless, the Act of Union was passed by the Scottish Parliament on 16 January 1707, giving birth to the new political entity of 'Great Britain' with a single parliament in London – to the accompaniments of riots in Edinburgh, Glasgow and other cities. Even where opposition was peaceful, there was general discontent at the fact that the commissioners rejected the preferred federal compromise, by which Scotland could maintain its independence as a nation. As union affected religious as well as political issues – for by it Presbyterianism became the national Church of Scotland – the abolition of Scottish independence numbered amongst a growing list of grievances harboured by those still committed to the return of the Stuart dynasty. Before he died James II & VII had told his son never to accept a union between Scotland and England, and thus the repeal of the Act of Union stood high amongst Jacobite aspirations.



Louis XIV appreciated that popular dissatisfaction with the Act of Union offered a strategic opportunity while he remained at war with Britain, if he could profit from Jacobite frustrations and restore the Stuart dynasty with the aid of French troops. Thus, in 1708 he ordered the assembly of a naval expedition which was to transport James Edward Stuart to Scotland. Five ships of the line and 20 other vessels sailed from Dunkirk in March, carrying 5,000 French troops and enough weapons for 13,000 men. The fleet encountered stormy seas and overshot the landing point, ultimately anchoring off Crail at the mouth of the Forth. A reconnaissance force went ashore, but when it encountered only a small group of Jacobite supporters the French commanders refused to land the Prince despite his strenuous protests, correctly deducing the exaggerated nature of James' claim that the whole country would rise in his support. The following morning a running action took place between rival French and British fleets, obliging the French to proceed north – so far, in fact, as to bring them entirely around the north coast of Scotland and back to Dunkirk, in the process losing several ships to adverse weather west of Ireland.

The expedition was a total failure, but failure might very well have been the outcome even if the Prince had landed and proclaimed a free Parliament as he intended, together with a call for a constitution and discussions to establish a new national church. The fact remained that, at least in the Lowlands, the population benefited from the 1707 Act of Union, which amongst many other principles guaranteed the existence of the Presbyterian Church as Scotland's established faith. South of the river Tay, Scotland could be relied upon not to back a Catholic monarch imposing himself on this Protestant country, whatever reforms James proposed to implement once on the throne. Many of the great landowners were similarly disinclined to support the Jacobite cause, for most had supported the Act of Union only the previous year.

After his return to France in 1708, James Edward Stuart served Louis XIV as a military commander,

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Portrait of Prince James Francis Edward Stuart (1688–1766), nicknamed 'The Old Pretender'. (Photo by Fine Art Images/Heritage Images via Getty Images)



The Earl of Mar raising the Old Pretender's standard at Braemar, September 1715. The Jacobites quickly took Inverness and Perth but failed to occupy Edinburgh. (Pictorial Press Ltd / Alamy Stock Photo)

participating in the battles of Oudenarde and Malplaquet (1708 and 1709 respectively), fighting troops whom – ironically – he claimed as his subjects. The war ended with the Treaty of Utrecht in July 1713, whose terms obliged France to no longer allow the Prince protection on French soil, whereupon he left for Germany. Thereafter Queen Anne refused James's entreaties that he should succeed her as the rightful heir, accepting nothing short of his conversion to Anglicanism, which the Prince flatly refused to contemplate. Anne died on 1 August 1714, whereupon George I became King of Great Britain. A new upsurge of Jacobite grievances led to a serious rebellion the following year, much of it centred on the failure of the Act of Union to bring Scotland the economic benefits that had been promised, together with the government's refusal to extend rights promised to the Scots, and restrictions imposed on the religious freedoms of the established church of Scotland.

Matters came to a head when the Earl of Mar raised the Prince's standard at Braemar in September 1715.

Jacobite forces captured Inverness and Perth but failed to take Edinburgh Castle. By the following month Mar had 6,000 men under arms, with 2,500 clansmen from the west moving to join him, upwards of 3,000 more coming from the north, and small numbers of supporters in the north of England and the Scottish Borders gathering. Meanwhile, the Duke of Argyll, the commander of government forces in Scotland, busied himself increasing the Hanoverian military presence north of the border, although this did not prevent, in late October, the Jacobites from invading England where they expected support from supposed adherents in Lancashire. The rebels duly reached Preston, where government troops under General Wills attacked the town from two directions on 12 November, accepting the surrender of its garrison two days later.

On the 13th, meanwhile, Argyll met Mar's forces at the battle of Sheriffmuir, near Dunblane, which ended indecisively after the approach of darkness. Still, the action denied Mar the ability to move south as he had intended, and with many Highlanders deserting, he returned to Perth. The Earl of Sutherland, meanwhile, with clans loyal to the government, retook Inverness, and in the last months of the year Mar's forces continued to dwindle through desertion while Argyll's increased. Thus, even when James Edward Stuart landed near

The surrender of the Jacobite rebels at Preston Market Place 1715 by JR Brown, 1901. The revolt failed partly because of the absence of a rising in England. (Courtesy of Blackpool Borough Council, Town Hall Collection, Blackpool)



Aberdeen in late December, the declining fortunes of the Jacobite cause were clear for all to see. With the Jacobites in retreat by the end of January 1716, the Prince embarked for France, the loyal clans dispersed to their respective homes, and the rebellion ground to an end by mid-February. For several months government forces remained in the pro-Jacobite areas of Scotland in an effort to stamp out the last vestiges of the rebellion, seizing the property of prominent rebels and disarming clans known to have participated in the uprising or which were suspected of aiding it. The inaccessibility of the Highlands hampered this work, and in the end reprisals fell relatively lightly on the Scots but rather more harshly on those areas of England where Jacobite support was strongest.

Following the collapse of the '15, James did not find himself welcomed on his return to France. Louis XIV was now dead and the regent no longer wished to pursue the late king's hostile policies against Britain. Accordingly, James and his retinue of exiled adherents eventually settled in Rome, as guests of the Pope. There the Jacobite cause continued to smoulder, with the movements and cabals of its supporters the focus of considerable attention by British agents on the Continent for the next 30 years. Events soon justified their suspicions. The '15 had demonstrated that the chief potential threat remained a rising among the Jacobite clans in Scotland, supported by regular troops supplied from the Continent. Only four years later, Philip V of Spain found he could make use of the Jacobites in a disruptive capacity – partly in reprisal for the destruction of the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro – by launching a diversionary expedition to Scotland and effecting a major landing in England. While the main fleet was defeated at sea the diversionary force, complete with Spanish mercenaries, landed in Scotland to cooperate with Highlanders and Jacobite exiles under the command of the Marquess of Tullibardine, a Scottish Jacobite returned from exile. When his forces met General Wightman's government troops at Glenshiel on the west coast on 10 June 1719, they were

OPPOSITE

A memorial cairn commemorating the battle of Sheriffmuir in 1715, erected by Clan Macrae. (Quillpen royalty free stock / Alamy Stock Photo)



The battle of Glenshiel, 10 June 1719. The decisive, and indeed the only major action of the failed Jacobite rising of that year. (Asar Studios / Alamy Stock Photo)

driven from the field, the Highlanders evaporating into the glens beyond the reach of the authorities and leaving the Spanish to capture and eventual repatriation. James learned of the disaster while in Madrid and thereafter took no further active part in attempting to restore his dynasty to the British throne – except perhaps in one way. In September he married a Polish noblewoman who the following year bore him a son, Prince Charles Edward Stuart. Twenty-four years later, it would be this young man, Bonnie Prince Charlie, who would launch the last major attempt to re-establish the Stuart dynasty on the British throne.



WARRING SIDES

The armies of two kings

The British Army

The elements of the British Army that fought in the campaigns of 1745–46 were of mixed quality, from units comprising raw recruits to veteran regiments recalled from the Continent where they were engaged with the French in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48). The public viewed the Army with suspicion, as memories of Cromwell's employment of troops under the Commonwealth to maintain his hold over the nation and quash Parliament remained fixed in the British imagination, which, taking a jaundiced view, regarded a standing army more as an instrument of tyranny and an unnecessary public expense than a vital instrument for the nation's defence.

Regiments were composed of one or in some cases two battalions (which, it must be stressed, almost never operated in the field together or indeed even served in the same campaign), with each battalion consisting of ten companies of about 30 to 40 officers and men, giving a full unit strength of between 300 and 400 of all ranks. Each regiment bore both a number and the name of its colonel, though such officers seldom accompanied their regiments, the responsibility for administration in the field falling to the lieutenant-colonel or the major. Since a regiment seldom fielded more than one battalion, 'regiment' and 'battalion' became effectively synonymous terms.



The battle of Lauffeld during the the War of the Austrian Succession, 27 July 1747, in which Marshal Maurice de Saxe defeated British forces led by the Duke of Cumberland. (Photo by Photo Josse/ Leemage/Corbis via Getty Images)

The infantry carried a heavy, hard-wearing muzzle-loading smooth-bore flintlock musket which fired a round lead ball weighing just over an ounce. A trained infantryman could fire at a rate of two rounds a minute, supported in close combat by his 17-inch steel bayonet, though it must be emphasized that the outcome of battle in the 18th century depended much more heavily on the effectiveness of small-arms fire than on hand-to-hand fighting. In action, the battalion deployed in three-rank lines in order to bring the maximum number of muskets to bear. Firing by platoon, if performed correctly, enabled the unit to discharge its weapons in a continuous fashion. Over time and amidst the pressure of battle, platoon-firing sometimes degenerated into a

continuous, uncoordinated fusillade, but so long as the distance to the enemy stood at less than 100 yards – or ideally closer to half that distance – the infantry could achieve an effective and quite often devastating result.

Cavalry played a relatively minor role in the rebellion, except at Culloden, where Cumberland deployed two regiments of dragoons and one of light horse. Dragoons, originally operating as mounted infantry but infrequently used for this purpose, wielded a straight, heavy broadsword similar to that carried by Highlanders, two pistols and a shorter version of the infantry musket for use on foot. Regiments of light horse wielded a curved sabre, two pistols and a carbine – a lighter and smaller-calibre weapon than the musket carried by dragoons – which could be employed in the saddle. Regiments were divided into squadrons and further into troops, with units seldom numbering more than 200–300 of all ranks – at best qualifying as an understrength regiment. Cavalry charged with drawn sword, but only at the trot; they never reached the gallop as would become customary later in the century.

The Army deployed only a handful of guns in the rebellion, and only made effective use of these at Culloden, where Cumberland employed six mortars and ten 3-pounder cannons (to the Army, always ‘guns’), whose shot bounded across the ground, mangling those unfortunate enough to stand in their path. Mortars fired a type of explosive shell dependent for its effectiveness both on proper trajectory and a well-timed fuse. Rounds lobbed indirectly over walls and fences offered unreliable results unless handled by a well-trained crew.

Most soldiers were drawn from the ranks of agricultural labourers and those who had conducted a trade such as shoe-making, carpentry or cloth-making, and accepted the king’s shilling if they fell on hard times. Thus, the stereotypical characterization of the army as a reservoir of criminality – men coerced into service as an alternative to prison – is not entirely borne out by the facts. Most recruits were young, between 17 and 25, though as service was for life, or until such time



Hogarth's depiction of the Guards marching to Scotland. At the outbreak of the rebellion, virtually the whole of the British Army was already engaged on the Continent against the French. (Photo by: Universal History Archive/ Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

as infirmity rendered them no longer fit and useful as soldiers, it was not uncommon to find men in their thirties or even forties still serving. Still, the emergency created by the rebellion led the government to pass Acts in rapid succession to meet the immediate need for more troops. Such Acts amounted to something akin to what the Navy practised by the name of impressment; that is, forcible enlistment, although never in substantial numbers. Under these Acts, the authorities leant on magistrates to make available to the Army all 'able-bodied men who do not follow or exercise any lawful calling or employment', as well as 'all such able-bodied, idle and disorderly persons who cannot upon examination prove themselves to exercise and industriously follow some lawful trade or employment, or to have some substance sufficient for their support and maintenance'. The soldiers enlisted by this method rarely possessed prior military experience, and consequently found themselves performing non-combat tasks.

Officers, though socially far more diverse than popularly believed, generally sprang from the upper middle class, the landed gentry and the aristocracy. Senior officers, in particular, largely attained their rank through patronage – connections with prominent members of the Army or the government. In addition to influence, wealth played a prominent part; since promotion arose almost exclusively through purchase of commissions, those with money necessarily dominated the officer corps. Those junior officers with more limited opportunities for promotion tended to derive from the less exalted sphere of the middle class, but nonetheless bore by their position the distinction of ‘gentleman’, being often the sons of officers themselves, or of physicians, ministers or tradesmen of comfortable means. Of course, a small number of men became officers by virtue of promotion from the ranks in recognition for distinguished service, but these formed a distinct minority.

British infantry were highly adept at musketry, the result of the great emphasis placed on small-arms drill. In most other respects training was sometimes woefully inadequate, though to be fair this varied according to the individual merits of the regimental commander, as no uniformity of training – or even regulations governing its frequency – yet existed in the Army. As James Wolfe, the future commander of the force that took Quebec in 1759, observed:

I have but a very mean opinion of the infantry in general. I know their discipline to be bad, & their valour precarious. They are easily put into disorder, & hard to recover out of it; they frequently kill their Officers thro’ fear & murder one another in their confusion...

The loyalist Highlanders

Amongst the numerous clans spread widely across the Highlands and islands, it was Clan Campbell that exercised the most powerful influence in the west of Scotland, especially in Argyll, under the duke of that name. Still other branches of Campbells lived

under the feudal influence of the earls of Breadalbane, Loudoun, and various lesser chiefs. In 1745, it was John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, who commanded all loyalist independent companies and the more informally organized clan recruits.

While the Campbell leadership itself stood loyal to King George, ordinary clansmen probably held no special place in their hearts for this ‘German’ sovereign, and served their chiefs during the rebellion only out of loyalty and obligation – in the same manner as many of their Jacobite counterparts, by no means all of whom embraced the notion of a Stuart restoration. Thus, to many of both the loyalist and rebel rank-and-file clansmen, the ’45 represented a clash between rival clans – albeit on a large scale – providing in the case of the Campbells an opportunity to avenge past and present wrongs against the MacLeans, Camerons and the Stewarts of Appin, against all of whom the Campbells harboured long-standing grievances of one kind or another, many avenged by cattle-raiding forays or violence, only to be returned in kind in a vicious cycle sometimes stretching back generations.

Various loyalist units supported the government, most prominently the Duke of Argyll’s Regiment, a militia whose tradition of service to the Protestant line dated back to 1689 and its establishment under William and Mary. The Duke of Argyll’s Regiment was raised from the clansmen and tenantry of the aristocracy of Argyll, Loudoun and Breadalbane, and its men were mostly volunteers from Clan Campbell. Their colonel was the son of John Campbell of Mamore, a major-general of Argyll Militia, a loyal supporter of the government and a kinsman of the Duke of Argyll, hence the unit’s designation. The independent companies raised by Lord President Forbes in the northern and western Highlands accounted for most of the men furnished by the loyal clans. Poorly trained and seldom particularly motivated, they proved an indifferent presence in battle – which often accounted for their odd deployment. The Argyll Militia, which boasted 12 companies at the battle of

Falkirk, were posted on the far right, near the bottom of the hill. In the same action, the Glasgow Militia, being considered insufficiently trained to be fit for the line, were placed on the hill but behind a line of dragoons. Still, when decently officered and in the presence of regular troops, loyalist militia could perform well. The Campbells, like their rebel counterparts, wore the kilt, dirk, plaid, musket and broadsword, but to distinguish themselves as loyal to the Hanoverian line wore in their dark bonnets a badge of myrtle and a red or yellow saltire, as opposed to the white ribbon or cockade of the Jacobites.

The Jacobite army

As is well known, the Jacobites drew the bulk of their forces from the Highlands, but the clansmen's motives for participation in the rebellion widely varied. Some joined out of a mere sense of duty to their chief or landlord, and those whose hearts did not truly rest in

Clan graves at Culloden Moor. Such men fought in defence of ancient privileges and a way of life which they saw threatened. (Nick Bramhall, Flickr, CC BY-SA 2.0)



the cause sometimes made indifferent fighters. Others, compelled to serve by threats made against themselves or their families and with the prospect of seeing their house burned and their cattle driven off, joined the Prince's army with even less enthusiasm than those motivated by fealty. Nevertheless, if an element of coercion existed in the Jacobites' recruitment policies, plenty of men qualified as genuine volunteers. These men, possessing genuine faith in the righteousness of their cause and manifesting a strong personal attachment to the Prince, were the most likely to serve as officers and cavalrymen – and played the most prominent parts in battle.

A fair number came from the ranks of the British Army as deserters, often taken as prisoners and agreeing to fight for the Jacobites, though as few appear to have figured amongst the captives after Culloden it is likely that their motives for serving the Prince amounted to little more than an opportunity to avoid captivity.

Highlanders alone did not account for the whole of the Jacobite forces; men drawn from the Scottish Lowlands in the role of fencibles or militia also joined up, with recruiters requiring landowners to supply either a quota of men or a sum of money in lieu. As in the Highlands, Jacobite commanders in the Lowlands sometimes employed terror, such as farm burning, to compel men to 'come out'. Apart from volunteers and impressed men, an unknown number of men joined the ranks as mercenaries. It is worth noting that total clan strength ran to at least 32,000 men (albeit including the loyalist clans), and yet perhaps only 6,000 men turned out in favour of the Young Pretender.

The Jacobite army contained a disproportionate number of officers, for commissions were issued to just about anyone whose social status appeared to qualify him as a gentleman. To some extent the authorities solved this problem by amalgamating some of the many smaller formations to bring them up to a respectable strength (there existed no conventional size for Jacobite regiments; instead, many were formed simply on the basis of the relationship between the men and a particular commander or clan). In the end, however, it was not

OPPOSITE

A senior officer of a Highland regiment, many of whom wished to improve conditions in their communities. (Stuart Reid collection)



uncommon for senior officers to lead ‘regiments’ whose numbers qualified them only as independent companies. Such officers could not necessarily meet the demands that are placed on the leaders of bodies of armed men; this resulted in Jacobite units on campaign sometimes displaying a lack of professional efficiency in such matters as the issuing and fulfilling of orders. If such men showed no hesitation in leading their men in the charge, they were as a rule not so adept in training or instilling discipline; although some attempts were made to teach their men drill and musketry, officers did so without the advice and support of properly experienced NCOs.

For the most part Jacobite infantry wore a more-or-less consistent style of dress, details of which Wade had described 20 years before the rebellion during his visit to the Highlands:

The Arms they make use of in War, are a Musket, a Broad Sword and a Target [a wooden shield], a Pistol and a Durk [a type of long knife] or Dagger, hanging by their side, with a Powder Horn and Pouch for their Ammunition. They form themselves into Bodies of unequal Numbers according to the Strength of their Clan or Tribe which is Commanded by their Respective Superior or Chieftain.

On the other hand, the weapons recovered by government troops from Jacobite prisoners at Culloden do not appear to support the view, popular among filmmakers and novelists, that every man carried such a full range of weaponry, though it is fair to say that he was generally well-clothed and identifiable by clan according to his distinctive plaid. In reality, no more than a third of clansmen appear to have carried a broadsword, but those who did – generally men of higher social status – occupied the front rank in battle, with their dependents arrayed behind with muskets and bayonets, mostly of Continental manufacture. Many of these the French had landed at Montrose and Peterhead, though some the rebels captured after battle, at Prestonpans and elsewhere.

OPPOSITE

A Highlander:
Clansmen were variously armed – by no means all with broadswords as popular sentiment suggests. (Stuart Reid collection)



Jacobite infantry tactics varied from the Lowlanders' adaptations of French methods, which called for a four-deep fighting formation which emphasized the use of the bayonet over musketry, to the classic Highland way of war: a rapid advance on the enemy with little concern for dressing the ranks or keeping some sort of organized formation. Once in close proximity to the enemy line, the Highlanders discharged their firearms before continuing forwards at a run, amidst ferocious cries and with swords held aloft, through the smoke and into the ranks of the opposing line, where combat with hand weapons finished the business. The Highlanders' charge took the form of a compact column or wedge, with the swordsmen invariably occupying the front rank.

As the Highlanders offered no genuine preparatory fire, the success of their charge depended entirely on the expectation of the receiving troops collapsing in the *mêlée* that followed the onslaught of a howling, sword-wielding throng of opponents, which after a brief clash of steel would instigate panic and a rout. If, however, the defending infantry maintained their composure and fired in disciplined volleys in the manner instilled in them by incessant drill, they stood a reasonable chance of fending off their attackers with the bayonet once the dreaded and inevitable collision occurred.

Therein lay the problem for the Highlanders. Success against well-drilled, disciplined troops depended heavily on psychology and intimidation. This was all very well against unsteady or poorly trained troops, but against professionals it left something to be desired. As Lord George Murray, commander of the Jacobite forces, learned from his subordinates after Falkirk, unless the Highlanders

... could attack the enemy at very considerable advantage, either by surprise or by some strong situation of ground, or a narrow pass, they could not expect any great success, especially if their numbers were no ways equal, and that a body of regular troops was absolutely necessary to support them, when they should at any time go in, sword in hand;

for they were sensible, that without more leisure and time to discipline their own men, it would not be possible to make them keep their ranks, or rally soon enough upon any sudden emergency, so that any small number of the enemy, either keeping in a body [i.e. a reserve] when they were in confusion, or rallying, would deprive them of a victory, even after they had done their best.

Regimental commanders clearly appreciated that despite the bravery of their men, their unconventional tactics and system of loose discipline demanded reform; in the short term, the army also needed a stiffening of regulars – the implication being that these would be French units.

Jacobite cavalry, in the form of such irregular units as Lord Pitsligo's Horse, Fitzjames' Horse and Lord Kilmarnock's Horse Grenadiers, played only a minor role in the conflict. The absence of formal training and its small numbers left the cavalry with no pretensions to being the equal of its regular counterparts in the British Army, but it did prove its utility in reconnaissance. Cavalry officers ranged from titled gentlemen from Edinburgh and other urban areas, to wealthy merchants and small property-owners (or their sons), with the ranks filled by the lesser-born. The Jacobite horse performed well on patrol, though they were prone to looting. Apart from the requisite sword, most troopers carried a musket.

Jacobite artillery, of varied calibre and largely consisting of light-calibre pieces captured from the British Army plus a few pieces supplied by the French from guns captured at the battle of Fontenoy, played a small part in operations and generally performed poorly in the hands of undermanned and virtually untrained crews.



OUTBREAK

The Bonnie Prince's rebellion

If there was a lesson to be derived from the rebellion of 1715 it was that there could be no hope of success without external assistance, whether this assumed the guise of foreign troops, arms and money, or volunteers from across England. But if the '15 had failed, the hopes and dreams of Jacobites had been far from extinguished. Despite the dissolution of their forces, they had not been vanquished in battle. Thus, the notion of restoring the Stuarts to the throne remained their principal aspiration, only awaiting a more propitious moment before fighting resumed.

Having said this, internal affairs in Britain remained peaceful for the remainder of George I's reign, which ended on his death in 1727, and the premiership under Sir Robert Walpole managed domestic matters deftly enough to placate Jacobite grievances. With Britain maintaining neutrality in European affairs for over 20 years, the Jacobites could also look to nothing more than moral support from France. Matters shifted in their favour, however, when in 1739 Britain became embroiled in a conflict with Spain known as the War of Jenkins' Ear over the question of the slave trade. The Family Compact between France and Spain – both under Bourbon rule – automatically committed these countries to war if either one opened hostilities with

OPPOSITE

Sir Robert Walpole (1676–1745), 1st Earl of Orford, Whig statesman and first Prime Minister. (Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images)



a third. When a general European war began in 1740 owing to Prussia's invasion of Austrian Silesia – with the French as Maria Theresa's ally – Louis XV naturally looked to revive the plan to aid the exiled Stuarts for strategic reasons, this time to divert British attention away from this, the War of the Austrian Succession.

Raising the banner of revolt formed one of the chief topics of discussion between French diplomats in Rome and a host of unofficial Jacobite representatives, who began arriving from Scotland in 1739. Though brought together by common interest, both sides nonetheless looked for assurances from each other; for the Scots, any proposed invasion by the French had to be well supported in material terms, while Paris wished to see a list of names of those Scots and English willing to fight. Jacobite promises that sympathizers in England would rise once an army had taken the field did not sufficiently answer French concern that their troops would be abandoned to their fate, and France insisted on a list of supporters.

With Catholic Spain now at war with Britain, Scottish Jacobite and French hopes received a boost, not least when in early 1742 Walpole lost a vote of confidence in the House of Commons led by Jacobite MPs and dissident Whigs acting on instructions from the Old Pretender. A new ministry, dominated by dissident Whigs, replaced Walpole's administration, with the Secretary of State for Scotland, John Hay, 4th Marquess of Tweeddale, proving indecisive and ineffectual enough to create a vacuum of political power in the Highlands, which Prince Charles Edward eventually discovered he could easily fill. Moreover, in June 1743 when an Anglo-Austrian and Hanoverian army suffered defeat at the hands of the French at Dettingen, Jacobite hopes again rose, whereupon they hatched a plan to send the Old Pretender to Britain. But James Edward Stuart, now in his fifties, declined, instead nominating his son, 'Bonnie Prince Charlie' or the Young Pretender, to lead the revolt. Charles, 24 years old, blessed with remarkable energy and a strong belief in his cause, eagerly accepted

the opportunity and happily met the King of France in December 1743 to discuss plans for an expeditionary force. Charles, bidding farewell to his father, left Rome in secret on 9 January 1744, carrying with him authority as regent of Scotland.

His absence from Rome could not go unnoticed for long, particularly by the British agents anxiously watching his movements for signs that would indicate renewed Jacobite activity at home. Charles, travelling in disguise and without the trappings typical of a man of his station, ventured through Tuscany to Savona, where he embarked for the south of France and proceeded by coach to Paris, where he arrived on 29 January. His absence had long since alerted authorities in London, whose anxieties were heightened by the concentration of naval assets in the ports of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. It remains unclear if Charles actually received a royal audience in Paris, but he outlined to courtiers the prospect of success in very positive terms and emphasized the importance of French troops' participation.

In this regard the king appeared to be true to his word: in November 1743 he had agreed to dispatch an expedition to Britain, and now 15,000 men were being concentrated at Gravelines for an invasion at two points, with Marshal de Saxe – one of the best of French commanders – appointed to command the main invasion force. Experience in 1715 had shown that any success would depend partly on the rising of English Jacobites, whom the French must support with a direct military intervention in the south. This was to be provided by a landing in Kent by 12,000 men under de Saxe, with Charles in his train, with the remaining 3,000 men under George Keith, 10th Earl Marischal, descending on Scotland. Any operations which might be expected to move ponderously south from Scotland, even with the expected simultaneous rising, did not suggest themselves as effective; instead, the French planned to execute a rapid movement against London with regular troops, ousting the government and king, and placing the Stuarts back in control of the nation's affairs.



Swearing allegiance to Prince Charles Edward Stuart. His hopes for widespread support from English Jacobites were dashed. (Photo by The Print Collector/Getty Images)

The British were not prepared to remain idle while their enemies planned an invasion. Admiral Sir John Norris assumed command of a Channel squadron off Spithead, the government moved troops to the south coast, the Kent militia assembled and troops were withdrawn from active operations against the French in Flanders in order to bolster the defence of southern England. Meanwhile, a French fleet under Admiral Roquefeuille, comprising 22 ships as an escort for the troop transports meant for the invasion, had already put to sea by the time Charles reached Dunkirk. Norris came within sight of Roquefeuille's fleet on 24 February 1744, whereupon the French admiral, concerned by his opponent's numerical superiority, made sail for France with all haste. Strong winds facilitated his speedy return, but also played havoc with the transports docked in port and awaiting the troops, while other vessels, fully laden, had already embarked. In the event, gales wrecked virtually the entire flotilla, sinking those already at sea and sufficiently damaging

those lying in port as to render them unserviceable, with 12 ships foundered and seven lost with all hands. Charles and Marshal de Saxe managed to return safely, but they had only barely escaped.

The vicissitudes of the weather at this point appeared almost providential to the British, for a spy in the French Foreign Ministry confirmed suspicions that an invasion was afoot, prompting the War Office urgently to recall further troops from Flanders and to transfer others from Ireland. The delay caused by the rough weather in the Channel also enabled British authorities to improve their preparations on the south coast of England. Above all, it inflicted such damage on the invasion fleet as to render impossible any imminent invasion.

But despite its failure, its very dispatch had far-reaching implications, for until now Britain and France had remained in contention only on the basis of their alliances with Prussia and Austria, respectively – nations whose armies presently confronted one another in the field. The hostile intention implied by the assembly of a large fleet and transports in the Channel and the northern French ports now brought Britain and France into open warfare, with formal declarations of war exchanged in October 1744. Under these circumstances, quite apart from the state of France's naval affairs, their troops would now be required to take on the Prussians, whose successes against the Austrians could not go unchallenged. But they also engaged Allied forces in the Austrian Netherlands (Flanders), an area of vital strategic interest to Britain. Thus, with its troops heavily committed on the Continent, in the short term at least France could only offer limited aid to any proposed Jacobite rising across the Channel.

All this put Charles in a difficult situation, for instead of arriving in England with French troops in support of his cause, he remained in France with no material support. Even his presence in Paris did not renew French interest in the cancelled expedition. Matters appeared to turn in the Prince's favour, however, when on 30 April



The battle of Fontenoy, 11 May 1745. Marshal de Saxe presents prisoners and captured flags to Louis XV. (Photo by: Christophel Fine Art/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)


1745 the French inflicted a serious defeat on the British, Dutch, Austrian and Hanoverian troops at Fontenoy, in the Austrian Netherlands. The commander happened to be the Duke of Cumberland, second son of George II, and with British forces in Flanders performing badly and the country bereft of sufficient forces to mount an adequate defence, now appeared to be the time for the Prince to act.

Fontenoy provided a helpful boost to the Jacobite cause, improving morale and encouraging those who believed that such a victory could be attained on British soil. Fontenoy also obliged King George to keep troops on the Continent, not least when in the wake of the battle the French captured the towns of Tournai, Ghent, Bruges and Ostend. Charles was ebullient, notwithstanding the knowledge, as he had been warned the previous year by one of his prominent adherents, that the Highlanders would not rally round him unless he arrived in Scotland with a large army and sufficient arms to supply his followers. Charles, bent on returning

to Scotland whatever the state of feeling in the country, decided to ignore this warning. Having come this far, he would not allow the opportunity to pass while his star appeared to be in the ascendant.

The French, unable to support the Prince with troops or weapons, therefore left him to pursue his own course insofar as he could purchase supplies and vessels at his own expense and leave for Scotland via a French port. Antoine Walsh, a shipowner and Jacobite supporter, provided a vessel, which took aboard approximately 1,500 muskets, 1,800 broadswords, 20 pieces of artillery and a supply of powder and ball, together with several thousand *louis d'or* to fund the enterprise. Only seven men formed the Prince's entourage on board the frigate *Du Teillay*: Francis Strickland, an English Jacobite; three Irishmen, including Colonel John O'Sullivan, who had served in the French Army and who later became a close adviser to the Prince; Sir Thomas Sheridan, Charles's old tutor; Aeneas MacDonal, a relative of the MacDonal of Kinlochmoidart involved in Parisian banking; and the Marquess of Tullibardine, who had fought in the 1715 and 1719 campaigns, but was now nearly 50 and suffering badly from gout. Together, these men have become known as the Seven Men of Moidart. The *Du Teillay*, with its small knot of adventurers, sat off

The engagement between the French warship *L'Elisabeth*, escorting *Du Teillay*, and HMS *Lion* on 9 July 1745, 100 miles west of Lizard Point. (The Picture Art Collection / Alamy Stock Photo)



Belle Isle awaiting its escort, *L'Elisabeth* (64 guns), which would convey some of the arms in addition to 700 men, and ensure that the Prince reached his destination.

Once *L'Elisabeth* arrived, the expedition set out with a plan to sail around Ireland and land on the west coast of Scotland, but on the first day of the journey the two ships were sighted by HMS *Lion*. In the course of the ensuing action *L'Elisabeth* fared the worst, suffering enough damage to oblige it to put back into Brest. The *Du Teilly*, which had remained aloof from the fight, survived the encounter without injury, but the absence of *L'Elisabeth* denied the expedition of half its manpower and equipment. Notwithstanding the poor prospects that this foretold, the Prince insisted that the expedition proceed. He still possessed funds, his adherents and a determination to open his campaign in Scotland with a flourish.

Despite a frantic search for the Prince by Royal Navy vessels, Charles's frigate managed to reach the Outer Hebrides, where a longboat guided his ship through inland waters to a harbour on the tiny island of Eriskay. There he landed on 23 July 1745. The rebellion had begun.



Prince Charles
Edward Stuart
landing at Eriskay.
(Photo by Culture
Club/Getty Images)



THE FIGHTING

Raising the standard of revolt

Charles's arrival did not make for an impressive show of force, and the following morning he discovered that the chief of the MacLeods and Alexander MacDonald of Sleat were not prepared to support him unless he could supply troops. Barring this, Charles was advised to return to France until such time as he could furnish something tangible. It appeared that he had indeed exaggerated the extent of support he could expect to receive in the Highlands, and yet he could not now withdraw, for a British warship sat outside the harbour, only barred from entering owing to adverse winds. Nevertheless, remaining in the Highlands offered a better prospect than withdrawing into likely capture; so under cover of darkness and profiting by a favourable shift in the wind, the Prince boarded the *Du Teillay* and made for the Isle of Skye, where he landed around noon on 25 July at Loch nan Uamh, near Moidart, on the west coast of the Highlands. This was the country of the MacDonalds of Clanranald. Aeneas MacDonald duly went ashore to gauge the level of support in the area. The small group of MacDonalds who returned aboard the frigate for a conference offered little more encouragement than the previous day: coming out in revolt without foreign assistance struck them as a hopeless cause, unleashing forces against which they could offer no



Prince Charles Edward Stuart and the Irish Jacobite Antoine Walsh on the shore of Loch nan Uamh, July 1745. (TopFoto)

adequate defence. Quite under what circumstances the young Prince managed to persuade the MacDonalds to reconsider is not known – some say on the basis of an emotional appeal – but they had the dubious honour of being the first clan to rally to the Prince's cause.

This initial element of support gave Charles the confidence he required to proceed further, prompting him and his party to land at Moidart with all the supplies aboard the *Du Teillay*, which the Prince ordered back to France. The Prince sent out an appeal, calling upon John Murray of Broughton and James Drummond, titular Duke of Perth. But everything hinged on the attitude of Donald Cameron of Lochiel, for clan chiefs already sympathetic to the Jacobite cause had pledged only to join a rebellion if Lochiel gave his blessing to the design. Lochiel, like so many Highland chiefs, openly expressed

his apprehensions that without foreign aid a rebellion was doomed to failure and thus the Prince could not depend upon them. Against this reluctance, the Prince argued that no time would be more propitious, for nearly the whole of the British Army was overseas, for the most part committed to the campaign in Flanders against Marshal de Saxe, who led more numerous forces than the British. In Scotland itself the government could only depend upon a few recently raised regiments, all Scottish loyalist militia units, with no experience in the field. Once the Highlanders prevailed over such numerically inferior opponents, the Prince's father would then be able to prevail upon the French for material aid – and, above all, troops – whereupon his supporters within Britain would flock to his cause. These arguments proved persuasive and Lochiel threw in his hat, signalling a decisive moment in the rebellion, for it triggered the automatic compliance of several other clan chiefs. The Prince and his new supporters now laid plans for a rendezvous to take place at Glenfinnan, beside Loch Shiel, on 19 August, at which the MacDonalDs, the Stewarts of Ardshiel, and the Camerons would gather.

But even before formal hostilities began, the Jacobite cause gained a boost when the Camerons and MacDonalDs of Keppoch captured a detachment of government troops sent to reinforce the garrison of Fort William, one of a chain of three forts (the others being Fort Augustus and Fort George) extending along the Great Glen which divided the Highlands. An otherwise inconsequential action, this episode raised morale out of all expectation. Only two days later, Murray of Broughton arrived in the Prince's camp and accepted his appointment as secretary. On the 19th, between 700 and 800 Camerons arrived at Glenfinnan, though they were short of weapons, while the Marquess of Tullibardine displayed a newly made standard of white, blue and red. The Prince addressed his followers with a less than inspiring speech and shortly thereafter MacDonalD of Keppoch arrived with 300 men and a handful of MacLeods. The rebellion was gathering steam.

THE JACOBITE REBELLIONS

ORKNEY



- Battles, actions
- Castles
- Government forts or barracks built 1719–1745
- Military roads constructed 1724–1745
- Sites where rebellions began
- Landing place of Prince James (the 'Old Pretender')
- Landing place of Prince Charles (the 'Young Pretender')



Charles was well aware that much depended on his ability to appeal to the Scots as a Scottish prince, even if that image would require modification in the event that he chose to take the campaign into England. In the short term, therefore, he began to acquaint himself with everything Scottish, adopted Highland dress and learned a bit of Gaelic. Meanwhile, news of the Prince's arrival in Scotland had reached England, where King George II had returned from Hanover and put a price of £30,000 on Charles's head – a vast sum at the time. If the English were resolved to the Hanoverian line, the Highland Scots were not, for most – and many in the Lowlands – despised the union with England. Irrespective of the Stuarts' right to claim the throne, the issue of the Act of Union alone constituted a vital issue around which Scots of many stripes might potentially unite.

Outmanoeuvring Cope

From the outset of the rebellion the Prince faced the fundamental problem that he could not draw upon the entire Highland population, estimated at about 30,000 clansmen of fighting age, as a military force. Only a very small proportion of these numbers actually materialized and even then, partly owing to the disarmament policies of 1715 and 1719, those clans who clung to their hopes of a Stuart restoration did not possess the resources to mount an offensive. Many, it is true, had defied the legislation requiring the surrender of their arms, but others still could not furnish the necessary quantities of weapons and equipment needed to place their forces on a proper footing. On the other hand, Charles had never assumed that he would have to oppose government forces with the Highlanders alone, and consequently had written an appeal for aid to Louis XV prior to embarking for Scotland. Thereafter, the Prince continued to reassure his followers of the likelihood of French support, and only a victory in the field, he argued, could guarantee this. It was a prospect made all the more difficult by the fact that loyalties in the Highlands were divided,

not least owing to the influential Lord President of the Court of Session, Duncan Forbes of Culloden, who as a staunch opponent of Jacobitism did his utmost to discourage the clans from aiding the Prince. Forbes' role would profoundly affect the course of events. Not only did he persuade some originally inclined towards the Prince to reconsider their duty, but he was thought so influential that he could have brought most of the clans against the government, had he chosen to wield his influence in the Jacobites' favour.

By the first week of August news of the Prince's arrival had reached Edinburgh, where the garrison made vague preparations for defence. Officials in London knew little of the nature of the revolt and of the Prince's movements, but neither they, nor their counterparts in Edinburgh, believed at this initial stage that the rebellion posed a genuinely serious threat, and thus made no substantial efforts to oppose it. Indeed, Scottish officials regarded the rebels as little more than rabble, whose defeat was only a matter of time. True, Jacobite forces remained small in number and hardly presented the picture of a highly trained or even well-armed fighting force; but the government's assessment of the threat they posed looked increasingly rash and the rebels took advantage of the government's relative indolence to raise men, supplies and arms.

Having said this, the government was not idle. On the same day as the clans met at Glenfinnan, Sir John Cope, commander-in-chief of the regular forces in Scotland, was in the midst of proceeding from Edinburgh to Stirling, in order to assume command of forces in the field, seek out the Prince's army and destroy it. Sir John had joined the Army as a cornet in a cavalry regiment in 1707 and subsequently assumed the colonelcy of several units in succession. An MP for three different constituencies from 1722 to 1741, he rose to become a brigadier in 1735, a major-general four years later and a lieutenant-general in 1743. When the rebellion broke out Cope was commander-in-chief in Scotland and responsibility for quelling the rising fell to him.



In the meantime, the Lord President oversaw the raising of independent companies of troops in the north, which would be placed under the command of the Earl of Loudoun. In addition to these and the existing garrison of regular troops in Scotland under Cope, the government could also deploy nine companies of troops recently raised for service with their parent units, then serving abroad. Some of these in fact had defected to the Jacobites and most were greatly below strength, but under the circumstances the government would make use of whatever resources it could gather in Scotland

The Glenfinnan Monument at Loch Shiel, built in 1815 in remembrance of the Highlanders who fought for the Jacobite cause. (Robert Cutts, Flickr, CC BY 2.0)

while the bulk of the Army was committed overseas, with no prospect of immediate recall. Charles felt he had reason to be confident – a position not altogether unrealistic in light of the authorities' prevarication.

Cope reached Stirling on 19 August, the day that the Prince's standard was raised at Loch Shiel, and prepared to pursue the rebels via the Highland road which ran through Crieff and the town of Taybridge to Fort Augustus. His march, with 1,500 men, four light field guns and four mortars, began on the following day. He left a regiment of dragoons at Stirling and another at Leith, since mounted troops could not manage the rough terrain. Short of trained gunners and burdened by wagons stacked with arms intended to equip the volunteers he hoped to gather on the march, Cope found progress slow. In the fashion typical of 18th-century armies, the troops were also accompanied by a vast train of carts and other vehicles carrying several weeks' supplies and provisions. The expected turnout of loyal Highlanders never materialized, though 40 men from Lord Loudoun's regiment joined Cope's force at Taybridge.

Both sides were now moving slowly on converging paths. The day after Cope left Stirling, Charles's army set out from Glenfinnan and proceeded towards the mountain of Corrieyairack, where he could block Cope's path to Fort Augustus. In order to speed his progress so as to arrive before Cope, the Prince ordered all superfluous baggage and equipment to be left behind, including 12 of the 20 guns conveyed from France. Ironically, thanks to one of the military roads constructed by General Wade across the Highlands 20 years before, the Jacobites reached the mountain first, whereupon they built entrenchments in order to ambush Cope's troops in the passes. The Prince's numbers had grown by this time: the Stewarts of Appin supplied 280 men, the MacDonalds of Clanranald brought with them 300, 250 Camerons had joined, and the MacDonalds of Glengarry and the Grants of Glenmoriston supplied a combined force of 400. With such numbers the rebels, although inferior in terms of equipment, training and


GENERAL COPE OUTMANOEUVRE, 25 JULY–21 SEPTEMBER

Prince Charles's advance

- ① 25 July: Prince lands on the shores of Loch nan Uamh, in Arisaig.
- ② 19 Aug: Rebel standard formally raised at Glenfinnan on Loch Shiel, answered by over 1,000 clansmen.
- ③ 21–25 Aug: Prince marches east, proceeding between Forts William and Augustus, in the direction of Corrieyairack Pass.
- ④ 26–29 Aug: Prince crosses Corrieyairack Pass to confront Cope, but, discovering him gone, proceeds south. Jacobite detachment attacks Ruthven Barracks, but is repulsed by garrison.
- ⑤ 30 Aug–4 Sept: Jacobites march to Blair Castle and Perth.
- ⑥ 11–16 Sept: Prince, his forces increased to 2,400 men, leaves Perth and marches towards Edinburgh, skirting government-held Stirling.
- ⑦ 17 Sept: Jacobites occupy Edinburgh, apart from the castle.

Lt-Gen Sir John Cope's advance

- (A) 20 Aug: Lt-Gen Sir John Cope, with 2,000 men, marches north from Stirling bound for Fort Augustus via Crieff (21 Aug) and Corrieyairack.
- 26 Aug: Cope halts at Dalwhinnie to convene a council of war. He
- (B) decides not to force the rebel-occupied Corrieyairack, but to make for Fort George at Inverness.
- 27 Aug: Cope's army encamps at Ruthven Barracks. Learning that rebels plan to ambush him near Slochd Mor Pass, he decides to outpace them and force-marches to Inverness, reaching it unopposed on the 29th.
- (C)
- (D) 29 Aug: Cope reaches the relative safety of Inverness.
- (E) 11 Sept: Cope's army reaches Aberdeen.
- (F) 15 Sept: Cope's forces embark.
- (G) 17 Sept: Cope's forces disembark at Dunbar.
- (H) 21 Sept: Battle of Prestonpans.



organization, now outnumbered Cope's force. Morale was high and the Highlanders desired nothing more than an opportunity to demonstrate their martial prowess.

On 25 August, Cope received intelligence at Dalnacardoch of the Jacobites' intention to engage him under unfavourable circumstances at Corrieyairack Pass during the course of his march to Fort Augustus. He continued his advance, reaching Dalwhinnie the next day, when he received confirmation of the rebels' movements and intentions. Still 20 miles from the Jacobites' camp, Cope decided that he could not confront the enemy in prepared positions and instead ordered his army to Inverness, a course of action which avoided the humiliation of a retreat to Stirling, and kept alive the intention to ultimately bring his army into action. Marching along the Inverness road and resting for the night at Ruthven, Cope had foiled Jacobite plans to surprise him in rough ground; only when some deserters from Cope's contingent of Highlanders reached Jacobite lines did Charles become aware of his opponent's altered line of march.

Cope's failure to confront and defeat the rebels at this initial stage of the campaign – and particularly his decision to divert his course for Inverness – had far-reaching implications, for it exposed Edinburgh and the Lowlands to Jacobite occupation if Charles decided to proceed south. He did. Rather than seeking battle with Cope in the north, as originally planned, the rebels could not resist the chance to take the lightly defended Scottish capital. In the meantime, Cope's army, its rations almost exhausted, struggled through the Grampians with much distance yet to be covered, not reaching Inverness until 29 August. In the event, the Highlands had proved the most formidable of regions – much more challenging than Cope had imagined. In having outmanoeuvred government forces and drawn them into a forbidding region, Charles had achieved an initial psychological advantage with, as yet, barely a shot having been fired.

At Inverness, Cope met with Duncan Forbes, the latter then seeking to attract recruits from clans



Sir John Cope, who suffered a serious defeat at Prestonpans when rebel forces assaulted his position from three sides. (The History Collection / Alamy Stock Photo)

perceived to be, or openly declaring themselves to be, loyal to the government. At the same time, Cope took steps to strengthen the Lowlands by organizing transports to Aberdeen to convey his troops south by sea in time to march on Leith, from there intercepting the rebels before they could reach Edinburgh. Time was of the essence: on 4 September he led his troops out of Inverness on the road to Aberdeen, from where they embarked on the 16th, having absorbed only 200 loyal Highlanders under George Munro of Culcairn – nothing like the result Cope had expected in response to his recruitment drive. The Prince had long since shelved plans to pursue Cope and had instead led his army through the mountains of Blair Atholl and into the Lowlands, welcoming into its ranks men furnished by Macpherson of Cluny. The advance guard of the rebels entered Perth on 3 September and the following day the Prince rode in wearing Highland costume – a deliberate ploy to encourage local support, though it is vital to emphasize that he still intended to unite the whole of Britain behind the Stuart claim. For the moment, however, such a lofty aim demanded execution in stages; thus far he commanded little more than 1,800 men, with supporters soon augmenting this when James Drummond, the Duke of Perth, together with Lord George Murray, brought in contingents. These men were to hold joint command of Jacobite forces, a situation fraught with so many difficulties that at one phase, by a bizarre and unworkable expedient, they led the army on alternate days to avoid falling into disputes over seniority.

But such friction lay in the future; for the moment, the occupation of Perth, in conjunction with Cope's retreat, did much to encourage rebel morale. With the city now in their hands, the Jacobites began to levy contributions from the local populace and attract donations from well-disposed wealthy families. Outlying regions also fell subject to taxation and by the time Charles's army left the city on 11 September he had not only raised substantial and much-needed funds, but also augmented

the strength of his forces to approximately 2,400 men – thanks not only to the contingents brought by Murray and the Duke of Perth, but additional men from the clans MacGregor and Robertson.

On 13 September the Jacobite army crossed the Forth about eight miles from Stirling, by which time the authorities in Edinburgh had begun to appreciate the seriousness of the situation. Horrified at the prospect of occupation, they could do nothing in the short term to fortify the city, whose walls mounted no artillery and, in any event, offered no real protection from attack for in places they stood no more than a few feet tall. Only the castle, a formidable structure with a garrison of 600 troops and a small complement of guns, could offer any reliable form of resistance; but even then its commander, the 87-year-old gout-ridden General Guest, relied on his men to carry him around on a stretcher. The city's authorities had begun to raise volunteers on 9 September for purposes of augmenting the strength of the City Guard, but nothing in the way of an adequate garrison stood to oppose the approaching enemy. Meanwhile, Cope made strenuous efforts to reach the city before the Prince. The vagaries of the wind, however, prevented him from landing any closer to Edinburgh than Dunbar, where he disembarked his troops on 17 September, with the guns following the day after.

At the same time, in his attempts to reach the same objective as Sir John, Charles had met no opposition in crossing the Fords of Frew and he occupied Linlithgow on the 15th. By the afternoon of the following day he had reached the outskirts of the capital and sent a summons to the Provost and Magistrates, calling on them to surrender without a fight in exchange for a guarantee that his troops would not harm the city's inhabitants and their property. Ominously, the conditions contained indistinct threats in the event of refusal. Even before this, the city authorities had already botched plans for the capital's defence; more than once, troops had marched in and out of the city in an ineffectual display of force, before returning within the walls with nothing to show for their pointless bravado.

Worse still, by the time the Prince had sent his summons, no word of Cope's approach had arrived, leaving the city's councillors without a hand to play.

The authorities duly sent a deputation to Charles's headquarters to negotiate terms, but in the meantime word came of Cope's disembarkation. Emboldened by new circumstances, the city council delayed proceedings by altering its proposals and placing the volunteers back on the alert. The Jacobites, brooking no delay, received with suspicion a new set of deputies dispatched to the Prince's camp in a transparent ruse to prolong discussions. After the failure of talks in the early hours of the 17th, the city's negotiators were returned by coach. When the Nether Bow port was opened to allow the coach to pass back out of the city and return to the Jacobite lines, several hundred Highlanders, hidden in darkness, forced their way in, disarmed the sentries at the other gates and overpowered the town guard. By dawn the city lay in rebel hands – just as Cope was disembarking his army at Dunbar.

The whole of the Jacobite army entered the city on the 17th – a remarkable achievement and without so much as a major military encounter to facilitate it. The castle, on the other hand, remained defiant, and the best Charles's troops could do was to blockade it for the whole term of occupation to prevent the garrison from sallying out and relieving the city. In the meantime, while the authorities remained sullen and embittered, the inhabitants looked on the invaders in bemused fashion, regarding the affair as something of a giant carnival, for the Highlanders with their peculiar array of weapons and often unshod feet made for remarkable viewing, as of course did the Prince and the Highland chiefs who attracted enormous attention in the streets. But celebrate as they might, the Jacobites had yet to be tested in battle; the taking of Edinburgh offered no evidence as to their true mettle and only the inability of the city officials to organize some sort of hasty defence prevented them from becoming stalled, just on the point when Cope might have arrived to preserve the capital in government hands.

While the rebel army established its camp just outside the city at Duddingston, Cope marched out of Dunbar on the 19th and advanced on Edinburgh, bent on engaging the Prince's forces and liberating the city. That evening government troops encamped at Haddington, while in a meeting that night the Prince and his military commanders decided that their rebel army must decamp in the morning and confront Cope before he reached the capital. The Prince's army, almost entirely infantry, had meanwhile risen slightly in strength to about 3,000 men; not, as hoped, from men locally recruited in Edinburgh, where the populace tolerated rather than actively supported the Young Pretender, but from several hundred men drawn from the clan Maclachlan, together with small numbers of men from Atholl. At the same time several men of prominence joined the Jacobites, including Lord Elcho, Lord Balmerino and the Earl of Kellie. On the other hand, little in the way of additional arms were to be found at Edinburgh, for the inhabitants had sensibly sequestered their weapons in the castle, though some captured muskets served partially to arm those Highlanders as yet without firearms. Thus variously armed, the Jacobite army left its camp at Duddingston on 20 September and proceeded to Preston, based on intelligence that Cope's army was advancing to there. Cope, at the same time, making for the flat ground between the towns of Seton and Preston, had sent Lord Loudoun to scout the area, upon which he returned and reported that the Jacobites were approaching.


Prestonpans, 21 September 1745

Cope reached the conclusion that he could safely establish his position on open ground a short distance north of Tranent. He initially faced west, with the village of Prestonpans to his front, in the expectation that this would be the direction from which the rebels would attack. It proved an excellent defensive position, offering protection on three sides: Tranent, with various coal pits, hedges, ditches and a large, seemingly unfordable




Scouts from the British Army, having fallen drunk, are taken prisoner in a tavern before the battle of Prestonpans, 1745. (Historical Images Archive / Alamy Stock Photo)

THE BATTLE OF PRESTONPANS



- (A)** Approach route of the Jacobite army on the afternoon of 20 Sept
- (B)** Jacobite advance on the night of 20 Sept
- (C)** Jacobite line of battle
- (D)** Jacobite attack, 21 Sept
- (1)** Cope's disposition on the night of 20 Sept
- (2)** Cope's line of battle, 21 Sept
- (3)** Baggage



swamp to the south, on the enemy's left. To the west lay the sea and the villages of Prestonpans and Preston, in the latter of which stood Colonel Gardiner's house with its high walls and Preston House park, surrounded by a 10ft wall of its own. To the north lay the sea and the village of Cockenzie. Lord George Murray, the Jacobite commander, made the mistake of attempting to occupy the high ground, which commanded a view of the government position from the south, without consulting those knowledgeable of the ground. When his forces reached the top of the hill they found that the terrain would not suit an attack, for at the base of the hill lay the marsh on which was anchored Cope's left, known as Tranent Meadows.

When he found the rebels now confronting him from the south instead of from the west, Cope redeployed to face south, thus holding a better position than before, with the marsh immediately to his front. The rebels decided to traverse the swamp and attack Cope from the east on flat, open ground. They marched in the early hours of the 21st using a narrow footpath identified by a local man. The movement was perceived by barking dogs in Tranent and observed by a mounted government picket at Riggonhead. Cope accordingly shifted his army again, to face east, with the marsh to his right. He ordered back the pickets to the main body, formed his lines and rode across the front to encourage his men, who in all numbered about 2,100.

The 44th Foot occupied the right, the 46th the left, and eight companies of the 47th and two from the 6th stood in the centre. All his artillery – four mortars and six 1½-pounders – were positioned on the right, but this small complement was rendered useless by the desertion of its civilian drivers and the naval gunners sent by HMS *Fox*. Only two officers and four men were available to man ten pieces. Cope had a total of 650 dragoons. On the right stood squadrons of the 13th, and on the left two squadrons of the 14th. One squadron from each regiment was held in reserve. The rebels had only 36 cavalry and about 2,300 infantry, divided into two parts, plus a

reserve. The considerable gap between the two bodies of the rebel army gave Cope, viewing them through the mist, the mistaken impression that the forces opposite were greater than they were, and that his left might be threatened. He consequently ordered two guns to be shifted from the right to the left, but the civilian drivers and gunners had since abandoned their posts.

With 950 men of the left wing, Murray launched an attack through the mist across a newly harvested cornfield. These charged obliquely towards the government right across the 200 yards that separated the rival forces. As they advanced the sun broke through and the two sides could see one another clearly. Some accounts claim the handful of men attached to the artillery fired their pieces and ran; others that the guns had already been abandoned and that Colonel Whiteford and another officer fired

The advance of the Highlanders at the battle of Prestonpans, 21 September 1745. (Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images)



five of the guns and all the mortars. Whatever the truth, the effect on the charging Highlanders was momentary and ineffective. Moreover, Cope's right was crowded by the return of the outposts, such that the 13th Dragoons had little space for manoeuvre. The front squadron under Colonel Whitney, as well as that under Colonel Gardiner – placed behind for want of space – refused to charge, and after a single volley from the rebels the horsemen fled.

On the left was equal disaster. As the Highlanders charged, the 14th Dragoons were given no order to attack and when their commander was shot the men fled, taking the reserve with them. Having fired their customary volley, the Highlanders cast aside their muskets and closed in with their broadswords. The infantry found their right flank as well as their front under attack and broke up in a matter of minutes. A detachment of 20 men of the 44th stood its ground



in a ditch until surrounded and forced to surrender. All the infantry rapidly melted away and although 450 of the cavalry were rallied by Cope, Lord Loudoun, Home and others, these resolutely refused to engage the enemy. Nor would the fleeing infantry stand, despite threats made by officers wielding pistols. Total rout ensued and soon the handful of officers and infantry who still held their ground were obliged to join the fugitives. The chaos enabled the clansmen to inflict severe losses on Cope, who retreated first to Coldstream and on to Berwick the following day.

Thus, in an action lasting less than ten minutes, Cope's army was put to flight and lost more than half its effective strength in prisoners. The rebels lost about 35 killed and 75 wounded. The government side suffered about 150 killed and at least 1,000 made prisoner, plus all their baggage. Cope's military chest, containing between £3,000 and £4,000, also fell into the Prince's hands.



At Prestonpans, the Jacobites crossed a morass under cover of darkness and attacked, routing their inexperienced opponents in only ten minutes. (©The National Army Museum / Mary Evans Picture Library)

Prestonpans was a great though temporary blow to the Hanoverian cause and conversely raised the morale of the Jacobites, who could no longer be held in contempt by their enemies as a mob of savages. ‘The greatest advantage we derived from it,’ Chevalier de Johnstone, Lord George Murray’s aide-de-camp, wrote, ‘was the reputation that the Prince’s army acquired in the onset; which determined many of his partisans who were yet wavering to declare themselves openly in his favour.’ Of at least equal significance, the outcome of the battle left Scotland almost entirely bereft of government troops, with the exception of Edinburgh Castle, Stirling and the Highland forts. The Jacobites, it seemed, were now a serious force to be reckoned with.

The march south

Emboldened by the triumph, the Prince wished to pursue Cope to Berwick. This proved impossible, however, owing to desertions sizeable enough as to render another pitched battle inadvisable, at least in the short term. The army, so recently blooded, could not afford a setback at this point lest it lose momentum and spoil the euphoric atmosphere following Prestonpans. Any evacuation of Edinburgh, moreover, threatened to jeopardize the benefits to be derived from using the capital as a base for recruitment, for Jacobite leaders now reckoned that, impressed by the tangible display of the Highlanders’ fighting ability, volunteers would begin to flock to the cause in large numbers.

Politically, Charles faced a difficult choice. While abolishing the Act of Union would be a popular decision, and a higher aspiration for most Highlanders than the re-establishment of the Stuarts on the throne, the Prince always viewed his mission as recovering the entire kingdom, including Ireland, and by abolishing the Union he would rapidly alienate English public opinion. To appear merely to be championing a narrow Scottish cause was to threaten the whole movement. To lend credibility to his cause, he therefore deemed it

vital to take the rebellion south to London, gathering Jacobite adherents in England as he went. Still, it was all very well issuing a public statement to the effect that he intended to re-establish freedom of religion and act to protect the laws and liberties of a free people; since such rights already existed as far as most of those loyal to the Hanoverian line were concerned, promises for their return struck them as empty and did nothing to allay their suspicions of a Catholic prince, still associated with the absolutism they had cast off during the Glorious Revolution more than half a century before.

Charles's council strongly recommended maintaining the army in Scotland; consequently, his forces continued their occupation of Edinburgh for almost six weeks after Prestonpans. Charles busied himself trying to woo as yet uncommitted clans and persuading Louis XV to provide more than merely moral support for his cause, while Forbes waged his own propaganda campaign in Scotland against the Jacobites. The inhabitants of Edinburgh itself showed little inclination to join the Prince, but Charles enjoyed rather better success in outlying regions, drawing on the support of John Gordon of Glenbucket of Aberdeenshire, with 400 men; Lord Pitsligo with a corps of well-armed and well-mounted troops from the counties of Aberdeen and Banff; Mackinnon of Mackinnon with 120 men from Skye; and Lord Ogilvy with several hundred followers from Angus.

Meanwhile, if the French refused to send troops, they appreciated that the rebellion could not survive without arms. In October, three ships arrived at Montrose and Stonehaven with weapons and equipment and a small party of French artillerymen, in addition to a representative from the court of Louis XV. The rebels expected rather more, but the Prince placated his followers with assurances that it merely represented the first of several shipments, with foreign troops to come, too. In the meantime, they could not remain static forever, for even while they attracted supporters from their base in Edinburgh, the British government was fully occupied in gathering troops in England for a renewed

offensive. Troops recalled from Flanders, together with Dutch forces, now stood on English soil, and by the end of October the Prince learned that a force under Field Marshal Wade had reached Newcastle. On the 19th, the Duke of Cumberland, third son of George II, was recalled from Holland, and shortly thereafter several regiments of foot and horse arrived home. In addition to the forces dispatched to the north-east, major bodies stood in the Midlands and along the coast of south-east England. Supplementing all these, volunteer units, albeit often only of company strength, were assembling the length and breadth of the country. Meanwhile, the king appointed the Duke of Cumberland commander-in-chief of forces at home; he established his headquarters with the force in the Midlands.

While Charles continued to argue for a strike into England so as to confront Wade's army before it became too powerful to overcome, Lord George Murray advocated waiting until the army had benefited from growing numbers and further training. If rebel forces were to cross the border, he argued, they should proceed through the county of Cumberland, allowing them to draw upon Jacobite supporters from the north, particularly areas believed to be broadly sympathetic such as Northumberland and possibly Lancashire. Carlisle appeared the best place for the army to establish itself, with any further volunteers from Scotland still within reach. The army duly left Edinburgh in two columns, one under Prince Charles Edward and Lord George Murray, and another under the Marquess of Tullibardine and the Duke of Perth, who would take a different route to Carlisle. The army now stood at what on the Continent only qualified as division strength: 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, plus enough provisions to maintain this force for the coming campaign. However the men, rested from several weeks' stay in Edinburgh, boasted proper arms and clothing and no longer hailed entirely from the Highlands, for in addition to 13 clan regiments were five from the Lowlands, plus 13 pieces of artillery, of which six came from France and the remainder from the field at Prestonpans.

The Jacobite army marched out of Edinburgh on 1 November, much to the relief of the population, but for many Highlanders the notion of fighting at such a considerable distance from home did not prove popular, with increasing numbers of desertions the result. On reaching Kelso, Charles's column halted for the day before proceeding to Jedburgh. On 9 November it reached the outskirts of Carlisle, meeting there the force under Tullibardine, who had taken a route through Peebles and Moffat. The garrison of local militia under Colonel Durand held the castle, whose guns drove off the rebels. But the following day the Jacobites sent word that the town was immediately to open its gates or face unspecified consequences. The mayor, Thomas Patterson, wildly overestimated the size of the force arrayed against him, and feared the worst when news arrived that Wade could offer no immediate relief. The public began to panic, and although the garrison pledged to defend the town, on 14 November Patterson dispatched a deputation to the Jacobite camp, which was by then established at Brampton in order best to resist Wade if he chose to advance. Learning from the experience at Edinburgh, where the garrison in the castle had harassed the army throughout their occupation, the Jacobites insisted on the capitulation of both town and castle. The Westmoreland and Cumberland militia, appreciating that the rebels intended to assault the town if their terms were refused, began to lose the will to fight, and many began to desert. The Duke of Perth accepted the town's surrender at 10am on the 15th and the following morning the castle followed. This proved significant, for the fortress contained several guns, a sizeable supply of ammunition, 100 barrels of gunpowder, and 1,000 muskets in addition to those given up by the militia. Ironically, the cache of arms also contained a large number of broadswords taken from the rebels at Preston in 1715. Thus far the Jacobites had managed to confuse Wade, who remained at Newcastle. The two-pronged advance into England had fixed the field marshal in place, who occupied himself in fortifying



Prince Charles Edward Stuart, whose bid for the throne probably ended with his failure to penetrate further into England than Derby. (Mary Evans Picture Library/DOUGLAS MCCARTHY)

a city which was never a rebel target. Before Wade understood that he had been duped, the Jacobites had reached Carlisle, which prompted him to break camp on 16 November and march for Hexham. Discovering the roads incapable of sustaining the movement of his army and its vast baggage train, and appreciating that Carlisle could not be retaken with the forces at his disposal, Wade returned to Newcastle. Charles, anxious to press further into England, persuaded the Council of War to proceed into Lancashire, even as reinforcements for Wade's forces were on their way north and other regulars and militia had strengthened their presence at Stirling. A Jacobite thrust further south had increasingly little to recommend it, for government troops now stood

concentrated in three locations, all within reasonable striking distance of the rebel army, and thus far the hope of raising the English Jacobites had come to naught.

Nonetheless, the Prince's view prevailed against the opinion of most of his commanders, whom he persuaded that Jacobites in Lancashire were certain to offer themselves in service. After leaving behind a token garrison of a few hundred men, the rebels left Carlisle on 20 November, judging that it was only a matter of time before government forces converged on the town and trapped the Jacobites in place. For the Prince, striking at the enemy took on a new priority for they had to be prevented from uniting; already, each of the government armies outnumbered the total rebel forces by a factor of two to one. Any further concentration would render them unbeatable. Moreover, the Prince claimed to have correspondence from sympathizers further south who promised that armed volunteers would appear at Preston. Such assurances continued to lend credibility to his arguments and reassured him that in due course the whole of England would rally to his standard.

Nothing of the sort occurred. The people of the villages through which the Jacobite army passed watched with a mixture of curiosity and mild anxiety at the peculiar sight of the Highlanders in their striking national dress – but the Stuart cause meant little or nothing to them. Even members of the aristocracy who privately held Jacobite sympathies took no action, for without evidence of a popular rising or military success, they could not afford to risk their lives and estates for what might amount to a disastrous enterprise.

The army camped at Preston on 27 November, with no rapturous reception or evidence of a spontaneous turnout of volunteers, armed or otherwise. Moreover, the place reminded the invaders of their defeat there in 1715, the temperature had dropped precipitately during the march, and the men required rest after their exhausting advance. At the same time, the Duke of Cumberland assumed command at Lichfield. Not a single volunteer came forward at Preston and only

180 recruits offered themselves in Manchester on the 29th. It was now plain to see that no substantial support could be expected from the English Jacobites, who in the course of the advance through the north of England never contributed more than 300 men to the Prince's army. The rebel army had hardly established itself comfortably in Manchester before it was on the move again on 1 December, based on intelligence that Cumberland's army was advancing. The Jacobites chose Derby as their next objective, deploying a ruse to convince Cumberland that the whole rebel force intended to confront him. Lord George Murray marched a small force to Congleton by way of a diversion, hoping that the Duke would amass his troops against it and thus enable the Prince's principal force to march via another route and occupy Derby. The small detachment under Lord George learned that Cumberland's force stood at approximately 2,200 cavalry and 8,000 infantry, situated about seven miles north of Stafford, where the Duke suspected – as a consequence of Lord George's presence in the area – the rebels intended to make a westward thrust for Wales. Cumberland took the bait, while Lord George Murray's more mobile detachment easily broke contact and rejoined the Jacobite main body at Derby.

Most Jacobite officers determined that the army could not remain there for long. Wade was fast approaching and it was only a matter of time before Cumberland realized his error and reversed his direction of march; moreover, a third force, to the south, boasted a strength equal to the other two armies combined. The English Jacobites had not appeared in appreciable numbers, the French had utterly let down the cause, and even the north of England, thought to be a stronghold of Jacobite sentiment, appeared cold at best, hostile at worst. Winter conditions began to bite and though London stood only four days' march away, nothing could be expected but armed resistance from volunteers, rising daily in number, poised to challenge a Jacobite invasion force. Good fortune appeared to have accompanied the Prince this far; any further advance looked like tempting fate.

Retreat to Scotland

In the Council of War convened at Derby to consider the question, Charles expressed his determination to push on. However, the serious discontent which traced its origins at least back to Carlisle, and which at Manchester persuaded many officers that retreat offered the best hope of survival, finally bubbled to the surface, with only the Duke of Perth sharing the Prince's opinion on the proper course to pursue. The argument for retreat carried further weight when news arrived that Lord John Drummond, the Duke's brother, had reached Scotland from France with a regiment of émigré Scots as well as Irish troops in French service. These troops, in addition to men recruited to the body that remained in Scotland under Lord Strathallan, could serve to supplement the Prince's army – but only if it returned north.

Just after dawn on 6 December the Jacobite army consequently began its retreat. The fact that the rebels left behind large quantities of equipment suggested disorganization and flagging discipline – not an auspicious sign. Worse still, the officers did not initially reveal to the men their destination, leaving many with the impression that they were in fact seeking out Cumberland's main force. As the sky lightened the men soon began to recognize the ground over which they had trod before and realized, much to their disgust, that they would never reach London. The Prince grew visibly withdrawn and depressed, for the retrograde movement signalled the shattering of a dream, and his disconsolate mood began to pervade the rank and file, whose increasing indiscipline manifested itself in the form of looting. The attitude of the public as the army returned through its previous ports of call demonstrated the turn in Jacobite fortunes. If before local people had at least feigned happiness at the arrival of the Prince and his band of misfits, now they showed open hostility. Encouraged by agents sent ahead by the government and sometimes working in tandem with local militia, civilians actively disrupted the rebels' progress by refusing to sell goods and destroying roads and bridges. A mob met the

MAJOR TROOP MOVEMENTS DURING THE REBELLION



← Jacobite army to Derby
- - - Jacobite army from Carlisle to Culloden
← Government forces (Cumberland)
← Government forces (Wade & Oglethorpe) from Newcastle to Doncaster & Lancaster
- - - Government forces (Hawley) from Newcastle to Edinburgh

0 50 miles
 0 100 km

19 August 1745:
Jacobite standard raised at Glenfinnan.

7-31 January 1746:
Stirling unsuccessfully besieged by Jacobites.
17 January 1746:
Hawley's relief expedition halted at battle of Falkirk.

16 April 1746:
Battle of Culloden.

27 February-8 April 1746:
Government forces in winter quarters at Aberdeen.

17 September-31 October 1745:
Edinburgh occupied by Jacobite army.
21 September 1745:
Sir John Cope's army defeated at Prestonpans.

19 November 1745:
Wade's attempt to relieve Carlisle aborted at Hexham.

10-15 November 1745:
Carlisle besieged by Jacobites.
21-30 December 1745:
Carlisle besieged by government troops.

29 November 1745:
Jacobites occupy Manchester.

8 December 1745:
Wade's pursuit of Jacobites
aborted at Doncaster.

6 December 1745:
Jacobites turn back at Derby;
Cumberland's army at Coventry.

Government troop
concentration at Lichfield.

Prince's army at Manchester and although the former could not hope to oppose them with anything much more threatening than abuse and the odd projectile, the Jacobites' reception confirmed the sceptics' suspicion – if by now any confirmation were still required – that little tangible support was to be had much beyond the Highlands.

Cumberland now smelled blood. Aware that the rebels were withdrawing north, he worked assiduously to engage them as soon as possible. Wade received orders to move rapidly to intercept them. On 10 December he reached Wakefield, too late to overtake the Jacobites, who had at the same time entered Wigan. Wade then withdrew to Newcastle, leaving Cumberland, reinforced with cavalry from Wade's command, to pursue from Preston. The Jacobites continued to receive a hostile reception in the course of their retreat, and when the rebels reached Kendal on 15 December, the inhabitants fired upon them. At the same time, Charles received intelligence that Wade would not leave Newcastle, suggesting that Jacobite forces could reach Scotland without interception, but he was unaware that Cumberland, with 4,000 men, lay within two days' march. Damaged bridges and roads impeded the movement of the pursuer as much as the pursued, but with better transport and food the government forces advanced more rapidly and gradually narrowed the distance – so much so that on 18 December elements of Cumberland's force made contact with the rebel rearguard.

On 17 December the Jacobite main body arrived safely at Penrith but its rearguard lagged behind by about ten miles. While the sound of trumpets suggested a large body of enemy cavalry in the vicinity, in fact the threat arose from a small force of lightly armed mounted men who fled in confusion as soon as Jacobite cavalry scurried up the slope on which they stood. The rebels thereupon resumed their advance, but after two miles government forces attacked the clansmen in the rear of the column. However, Cumberland's cavalry could not be deployed as intended as the narrow road was lined with hedges



Stewart Orr

and ditches, which enabled the Jacobites to fend off repeated attacks and each time rejoin their comrades. When they reached the village of Clifton, two miles south of Penrith, elements of the Jacobite main body faced round and marched to assist their countrymen – the MacDonalds – in an effort to detach the pursuers from the rebel rear. While Charles ordered Lord George Murray not to engage his pursuers, the proximity of government forces rendered this impossible. Some government dragoons dismounted and established themselves behind a series of hedges and ditches, only to be driven off by a single Highland charge; although this skirmish took place without the Prince's blessing, he could not help but be satisfied with its result.

Although a minor action, Clifton enabled the Jacobites to separate themselves temporarily from their pursuers, and by marching through the night they reached Carlisle, where the whole force including the rearguard assembled on the 19th. Reinforcements from Lord Drummond's command were expected from the north, as well as the new recruits at Perth under Lord Strathallan, but with no sign of them in the vicinity the sensible course remained a continued retreat to Scotland. The Young Pretender demonstrated his particular dislike of abandoning England by leaving a garrison of 300 to 400 men behind at Carlisle. The Prince's officers appreciated the futility of effectively abandoning these men to their fate but, as in so many matters, they bent to the will of their titular sovereign. Charles knew Cumberland possessed no heavy artillery with which to lay siege to Carlisle, but the fact remained that this could be acquired in time, and once the big guns were committed against the city's totally inadequate defences the garrison would fall easily into enemy hands. Still, some of his troops, notwithstanding their uncertain future in England, actively sought to remain behind on account of their nationality, while the Prince appears also to have left a number of officers bearing commissions in the French Army so that, in the event of their capture, they would be accorded the status of prisoners of war

OPPOSITE

Even within the Highlands, many clans remained loyal to the government or in any event did not lend active support to the Jacobites. (The Stapleton Collection / Bridgeman Images)



A Jacobite impression of Carlisle. (Niday Picture Library / Alamy Stock Photo)


rather than of rebels. Whatever the motives, at the very least the garrison could slow the advance of government forces, and on 20 December the Jacobite army left Carlisle, reaching the river Esk in the early afternoon.

Nearly unfordable due to heavy rains, the river crossing saw men wading up to their necks in places along a chain of their comrades, linked by outstretched arms to form a human bridge. After two hours the army was across, with only the loss of some camp followers. Once again the rebels stood on Scottish soil, having last seen it on 8 November – but now with considerably poorer prospects before them. Still, the retreat had remained orderly, for the most part, and cost little in terms of lives or deserters. As before, the Jacobites split their forces in order to confuse those in pursuit. A contingent camped in Annan in Dumfriesshire on the night of 20 December while the second bivouacked in Ecclefechan. On Christmas Day the advance guard reached Glasgow, with the main body joining up the following day. The entire campaign had covered almost 600 miles in just under two months – a remarkable effort considering the poor state of the roads and sub-zero temperatures.

True to Murray's suspicions, Cumberland acquired the heavy guns he needed to reduce the walls of Carlisle, whose garrison surrendered on 30 December – two days after the besiegers emplaced the guns and threatened the castle with bombardment. The Duke then returned to London, ordering Lieutenant-General Henry Hawley, a veteran of the 1715 campaign as well as of Dettingen and Fontenoy, to pursue the rebels into Scotland with part of the Duke's force. The fall of Carlisle represented another poor decision on the part of the Prince, who failed to heed his subordinates' advice to withdraw all his forces from England. Still, opportunities yet remained to bring government troops to action in a pitched battle on Scottish soil. Ragged and exhausted though the Jacobites certainly were at this point, they by no means represented a spent force.

Events in Scotland during Charles's absence only highlighted the fact. After some deliberation, the clan Fraser joined the Jacobite cause and undertook the blockade of Fort Augustus. Lord Lewis Gordon, operating from headquarters in Aberdeen, raised funds and recruits from both the city itself and bordering counties, and defeated a force of loyal MacLeods. This was a small affair in military terms, but one that underlined the fact that the rebellion was never strictly a Scots–English contest. Similarly, while the Prince campaigned in England, Forbes, headquartered in Inverness, continued his efforts to mobilize support for the government, and in so doing preserved the extreme north for King George. On the other hand, Jacobite volunteers converged on Perth, where as many as 4,000 recruits added their weight to the Young Pretender's cause.

As the government expected the rebels to return to Edinburgh once news arrived of their departure from England, troops duly left Stirling to defend the capital. The Prince was unlikely to remain long in Glasgow, for its residents were known for their Hanoverian sympathies and attachment to the Protestant Succession. More than 100 of his men deserted in the city, where ten times this number had already come



The renewed siege of Stirling Castle in late January achieved nothing apart from providing an opportunity for many Highlanders to desert. (Author's collection)

out for King George. The rebels left Glasgow on 3 January 1746 and proceeded towards Stirling with a view to taking both the city and the castle. Again the Jacobites divided their forces, the Prince leading one column to Bannockburn via Kilsyth, with orders for Lord John Drummond to link up with him, and the second column under Lord George Murray advancing on Falkirk via Cumbernauld. When, after delays arising from the movement of heavy artillery, the Prince and Lord John joined forces, the Jacobite main body numbered approximately 9,000 men – the largest single force Charles would ever field in the course of the conflict.

The city of Stirling surrendered to the rebels on 8 January, but like Edinburgh before it, Stirling's castle held out, its position atop a steep rock rendering it unassailable barring protracted siege operations. Undaunted, the rebels dug trenches in unforgiving earth replete with stones, and struggled to mount guns with the requisite trajectory to inflict any damage on the impregnable position. Two days earlier, Henry Hawley, now commander of government troops in Scotland, had arrived in the capital with impressive resources: a portion of Cumberland's forces tasked with pursuing

the Jacobites across the English border, as well as most of the infantry drawn from Wade's command, originally at Newcastle. General Hawley had had a long and active career, having signed up as an ensign in 1694 and fought as a captain of dragoons in Spain. By the time of the rising of 1715, he was colonel of his regiment, at the head of which he was wounded at Sheriffmuir. In 1742, as a major-general, he accompanied Lord Stair to Holland and served as second-in-command of the cavalry at Dettingen. He fought at Fontenoy in May 1745 and replaced Sir James Campbell when he was killed in action. In the course of the rebellion he would maintain order through harsh discipline and other severe measures, and was known as the 'chief justice' by his men for his regular practice of execution.

On 13 January Hawley dispatched cavalry under General Huske to reconnoitre the area and discover the rebels' position. Two days later the army's main body, with Hawley present, followed, in order to break the siege of Stirling.

The battle of Falkirk

The Jacobites learned of their opponents' presence on 13 January, when scouts under Lord George Murray observed Hawley's van at Linlithgow. Rebel forces were recalled from their various concentrations in the vicinity of Stirling and assembled near Bannockburn, apart from a contingent of 1,200 who remained behind to continue their fruitless siege of the castle. On the 15th the Jacobites established themselves in line of battle on Plean Muir, six miles from Falkirk, and maintained their position for three days awaiting Hawley's approach. When government forces failed to appear, Lord George Murray ordered an advance to rising ground at Falkirk, within a mile of the government position.

Hawley had established himself with hollow and marshy ground to his front and several enclosures with water-filled ditches on his right. Murray decided to seize the Hill of Falkirk, an open ridge south-west of the town

THE BATTLE OF FALKIRK, 17 JANUARY 1746



To Glasgow
To Stirling


King's Encampment

Falkirk

To Linlithgow
and Edinburgh

Hawley's advance

Jacobite
line of
advance



Government forces

- ① Argyll Militia
- ② Glasgow Militia
- ③ Main line (regts, right to left)
- Ligonier
- Price
- Royal Scots
- Pulteney
- Cholmondeley
- Wolfe

- ④ Second line (regts, right to left)
- Battereau
- Barrell
- Fleming
- Monro
- Blakeney

- ⑤ Howard

Jacobite forces

- A Cavalry
- B Third line of foot
- C Ogilvy
- D Gordon
- E Atholl
- F Main line (regts, right to left)
- Keppoch
- Clanranald
- Glengarry
- Appin
- Lochiel
- Farquharson
- Cromarty



with a view of the government camp. They employed a deception plan which sent a column down a road in the opposite direction; although Hawley observed this he made no reconnaissance to establish the enemy's exact whereabouts, despite his considerable advantage in cavalry. Only at 1pm on 17 January did the government forces hear word of the rapid rebel advance, whereupon Hawley ordered the army to advance in a race to reach the summit of the hill before the enemy. Uneven ground confused the ranks and tired the men.

The rebels were deployed in three lines, with the first two of infantry, and the third of cavalry and a few French regulars. All told, the Jacobites numbered 5,800 infantry and 360 cavalry. Hawley's men were also arrayed in three lines, with the cavalry in the front. The general commanded about 5,500 infantry and 500 cavalry. Behind the dragoons were a further 700 loyal volunteers, deployed around houses and walls. More loyal troops, with a few companies of regulars – about 800 all told – stood behind the rear of Hawley's left.

Fighting began at 4pm when Hawley launched his dragoons in a frontal assault against one of Lord George Murray's Highland brigades. Rebel volleys did little damage but the charge halted, apart from a few troopers who reached the line and were driven off; soon the cavalry retreated towards the right, moving between the two opposing forces and taking fire from the remainder of the Jacobite line. One regiment rode back down the hill into a body of volunteers, who fired at them in protest. Delighted by their repulse of the cavalry, the rebel brigade launched an unauthorized counter-attack down the hill, chasing the dragoons and ploughing into a body of loyal militia. They were soon followed by the remainder of the Jacobite front line, which charged through the severe rainfall that was now blowing in the face of the government line. The majority of Hawley's men, tired from their advance up the hill, became unnerved and fled back down, though regiments on the right, protected by a ravine, remained firm and fired into the rebels' flank. The 4th then altered its front to face left, advanced against



the rebels, and stopped to fire several volleys. The rebels ran off, taking the second line, also panicking, with them. Some of the Jacobites rallied and returned to the field, but this gave Hawley's troops time to launch a small cavalry attack against the rebels who remained on the hill. At the same time some of the government infantry were rallied with a view to a counter-attack, but poor visibility and the absence of a concentrated rebel force on the field rendered this impossible. Moreover, when the Scots émigré infantry moved forward the government dragoons withdrew, taking the supporting infantry with them. On their return to camp Hawley's troops discovered that the artillery train had been abandoned, leaving the infantry to drag away one gun and recover two others later.

The storm had now become so severe that Hawley withdrew from his position and retired to the protection of Linlithgow. As a result of Hawley's abandonment of the field and the French occupying Falkirk with a few troops, the rebels could claim victory, in spite of the fact that most of their own men had fled the field. They were unable to chase Hawley to Edinburgh and ultimately retreated north rather than risk another such encounter. Falkirk was a disorganized battle, fought before the second lines of both armies were properly deployed. This later contributed to utter confusion for both sides, who found themselves fighting amidst thunderous rain, wind and growing darkness. Both sides claimed victory, but the credit must go to the Jacobites, especially as it represented a serious psychological blow to the government. Neither side suffered many casualties: the rebels lost about 50 killed and 70 wounded, while government forces suffered around 70 killed and 200–300 missing.

The news of Hawley's setback caused considerable dismay. The king, in his recent speech to Parliament, had reassured the House of his confidence that, with large numbers of reinforcements sent to Scotland, the rebellion would soon be quelled. Prestonpans had not been an aberration; against all expectations, Falkirk confirmed that the Highlanders could still mount an impressive attack and at the very least fight government

OPPOSITE

Doone Castle, near Stirling, where Prince Charles left a small garrison and a group of prisoners after the battle of Falkirk. (Author's collection)

The Duke of Cumberland. He pursued the retreating rebels into the Highlands until bad weather obliged a halt at Perth on 6 February. (Photo by: Sepia Times/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)



troops to a standstill. The humiliation took on all the greater significance when seen in light of the experience of the government troops, 12 battalions of which were veteran units, and nine of which had just returned from service in Flanders. Circumstances now demanded the presence of a new commander: the Duke of Cumberland, who had left Carlisle in order to take up command of forces meant to repel an invasion along the south coast. He now received orders to take command in Scotland to pursue the complete destruction of the Jacobite army.

William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, was born the third son of George II. His parents had groomed him for the Navy, and though in 1740 Cumberland sailed


on Sir John Norris' flagship, the young royal preferred a career in the Army. In April of the same year he became – naturally by purchase – colonel of the Coldstream Guards, transferring in February 1741 to the Grenadier Guards. In December, still only 20 and with virtually no military experience, Cumberland was promoted to major-general, in the worst traditions of the age. However, in April 1743 he accompanied his father on campaign in Germany and showed great coolness under fire at Dettingen.

Promoted to lieutenant-general in June, his request for any command in the campaign of 1744 was initially refused, as the king preferred to appoint the Earl of Stair as commander-in-chief of British forces. When, however, Stair refused to serve under the Austrian marshal, Königsegg, the king arranged to have his son appointed. In March 1745 Cumberland was given the title of captain-general of British land forces both in Britain and overseas, a position dormant since Marlborough's time. He took command at Brussels on 10 April and a month later confronted the French at Fontenoy, where he personally led an infantry attack on the enemy centre. Heavily outnumbered, Cumberland was defeated, thus enabling the French to complete the conquest of Flanders by October. While the French were in winter quarters, Cumberland, now grown quite corpulent and unmilitary in his bearing and yet still only 24 – the same age as his new nemesis Prince Charles – returned to Britain to confront the Jacobite threat.

Withdrawal north

Under other circumstances, the outcome of Falkirk ought to have pleased Charles and his followers, although it was of no tangible benefit to the cause of Stuart restoration. But it stood as only an incomplete victory which enabled Hawley to retreat without pursuit, thus preserving his forces in Scotland to fight another day. Charles returned to Bannockburn the day after Falkirk and his troops redoubled their efforts

AREA OF OPERATIONS: INVERNESS TO ABERDEEN



at taking Stirling Castle, where 1,200 men under the Duke of Perth struggled to make headway, in exchange for many lives lost from sniping and exhaustion as well as much valuable time. Many clan leaders began to advise lifting the siege and withdrawing north into the Highlands – thus avoiding the superior numbers of government forces now marching to the relief of Stirling – to establish winter quarters in the safety of the north, and ultimately seize the Highland forts. The Prince reluctantly agreed; indeed, he had little choice, for he appreciated that he had overruled his chiefs on numerous occasions in the course of the rebellion and could no longer dictate strategy in light of the sacrifices and mistakes already made.

The rebels began their retreat north on 1 February, marked by poor organization and disagreements over plans. At Crieff, a Council of War decided to divide the army and proceed north, with both elements to rendezvous at Inverness. The Prince's troops were to march over the Grampians along the military road, while Lord George would lead the Lowland troops along the coast road to Inverness via Angus and Aberdeen. Meanwhile, the Duke of Cumberland had reached Edinburgh on 30 January, where he received an enthusiastic welcome. The army left the capital on the following morning, keen to discover the whereabouts of the rebel army and bring



Retreat of the Highlanders from Perth, February 1746, following the failure of the Jacobite siege of Stirling and large-scale desertions. (Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

it to battle. For his part Charles was keen to convince his followers that his campaign was not to be a repetition of 1715–16, in which the Jacobites, after initial success, had retreated into the Highlands, only for the army to disperse and their leader return to France, his adherents to suffer the consequences.

Charles reached Inverness where, as elsewhere, a small force of local militia, regulars and volunteers held the stronghold – in this case Fort George, to the Highlanders a hated symbol of Hanoverian rule – against calls for surrender. The garrison lost heart and gave over the place on 20 February, whereupon the jubilant clansmen blew the structure to smouldering ruins. Lord George Murray had now arrived on the scene from Aberdeen, his troops freezing and exhausted.

The Duke of Cumberland, meanwhile, his forces burdened by an immense baggage train in the depth of winter and unable to keep pace with the rebels, decided to rest his men at Perth and await better marching conditions. Campaigning in the Highlands at this time of year posed a host of logistical problems which he was anxious to avoid. While the Duke remained at Perth, 5,000 Hessian mercenaries and other auxiliaries arrived in the Firth of Forth, meant to garrison Perth on the departure of Cumberland's forces for Aberdeen, their next objective. The Jacobites were not inactive; they captured Fort Augustus on 5 March and several weeks later the Duke of Perth put to flight the forces under Lord Loudoun. A group of loyal Argyllshire militia in Keith were taken prisoner, and Macpherson of Cluny and Lord George Murray conducted a brilliant thrust into Perthshire and besieged Blair Castle. But such operations were merely peripheral to the principal concern: the whereabouts of Cumberland's main army, about whose progress intelligence arrived at rebel headquarters on 12 April. It was now in Aberdeen; just over 80 miles from the Prince's in Inverness. The future of the Jacobite cause would now rest on the rebels' response. From all around, their forces answered orders to consolidate in anticipation of imminent battle.



HOW THE WAR ENDED

The battle of Culloden

By April 1746 the Jacobite army had passed its peak; it had suffered considerably from the trials of winter, its provisions were low and neither the Prince's treasury nor the private finances of his officers could do much to meet the desperate financial needs of the troops, whose pay by this time stood weeks in arrears. Nothing further could be gleaned from the Lowlands owing to its occupation by government forces, the Royal Navy was successfully blockading the coast, choking off further supplies from the French, and many otherwise loyal clansmen began to return to their homes to plant spring crops. Nor could all the troops be recalled in time to meet Cumberland's offensive. Lochiel and Keppoch were busy besieging Fort William with their forces; others were in Badenoch; Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat was on a recruiting drive for his regiment and 700 other clansmen – Mackenzies, MacGregors and MacDonalds – were in Sutherland keeping an eye on Loudoun's dispersed units.

Given such dispositions, by some accounts at least a third and as much as a half of the Jacobite forces were not immediately available to the main army under the Prince and Lord George Murray. Nevertheless, the Prince clung to the belief that his Highlanders could continue to overcome all adversity and accomplish ever-greater

feats against an enemy whose forces stood superior to his own in all respects, except perhaps its senior leadership.

In contrast, when Cumberland's army left Aberdeen, making its way through Banff, it numbered 7,100 men, with reinforcements en route. On 14 April the army, now increased to a strength of 9,000, reached Nairn, approximately 17 miles from Inverness. The following night the Jacobites attempted a raid against government lines, but in the confusion and darkness nothing but exhaustion and demoralization prevailed, obliging the troops to return to their position on Culloden Moor, where on the 16th Cumberland advanced to make contact. The culminating act of the rebellion was now to be played out.

Culloden Moor runs east to west and at the time of the battle comprised a broad, fairly level, grassy grazing ground for cattle. Most of the moor lay open, but dry-stone walls partly enclosed some of its fields, thus rendering difficult the possibility of outflanking the Jacobite position. This circumstance, at least in the initial phase of the battle, left Cumberland little choice but to advance against the rebel line across open ground of his adversary's choosing. Characteristic of much of the Highlands, the ground was not substantial enough to absorb the heavy amount of precipitation built up over

The Culloden battlefield, whose open, gently undulating ground offered an unhindered field of fire to government forces. (Rob Atherton / iStock / Getty Images Plus)



winter and stood too level for much of it to run off, thus leaving the rough grass very wet and the ground boggy, particularly on the rebel left. A number of buildings dotted the area, principally the farmsteads at Leanach and Culchunaig.

Commanded by Lord George Murray, the Jacobite forces formed up on the moor facing north-east, their left wing fixed against a number of six-foot walled enclosures called the Culloden Parks. Thus established, the rebels enjoyed a secure position for their left flank. The boggy nature of the ground, although a nuisance to the progress of infantry – in places water reached up to the men's knees – posed a clear impediment, though not an insurmountable one, to cavalry. On the Jacobite right, near Culchunaig, on the other hand, the ground was drier, and here the rebels anchored their right wing against the corner of the enclosures, which extended down to the river Nairn.

The Jacobite front line consisted, from the right, of three battalions of the Atholl Brigade of about 500 men in all, 650 Camerons, 150 men of the Appin Battalion, and about 500 Frasers and others from Inverallochy. To their left stood approximately 500 from Lady Mackintosh's battalion, 150 Farquharson men, approximately 300 Highlanders from the clans MacLean, MacLachlan and Chisholm, and, finally, three battalions of MacDonalds, numbering perhaps 900 all told. While this put the strength of the Jacobite front line at about 3,650 men, the high rate of desertion, exacerbated by the temporary absence of stragglers, probably reduced this figure by several hundred.

In the second line, on the right stood about 350 men from the Royal Ecossois. In roughly the centre stood about 500 men of the Aberdeenshire Regiment, followed by another 500 from the Forfarshire Regiment. Two hundred Stewart men stood to their left, followed by the Footguards and Glenbuchat's Regiment, of about 200 strong each. Further along, the Duke of Perth's regiment numbered around 300, and, lastly, anchoring the left stood the Irish Picquets – 300 men formed from



The poorest rebels at Culloden carried simple implements like pitchforks and scythes, while others carried Lochaber axes or muskets. (Highland Council)

the Irish regiments of the French Army. To the right rear stood three units of cavalry – a mere two squadrons of about 70 each, plus a small escort in the centre guarding the Prince.

While the Jacobites assembled themselves on the moor, Cumberland's forces approached as far as Leanach, where they established their final positions and unlimbered their artillery. The British front line, commanded by the Earl of Albermarle, consisted of, from right to left, the 2/1st (Royal) Regiment, the 34th Foot, the 14th Foot, the 21st (Royal Scots Fusiliers), Monro's 37th Regiment, and Barrell's 4th Foot on the extreme left – 2,575 troops in all. Ten 3-pounders were deployed in pairs between the regiments, while the mortars stood ready to fire indirectly over the second line.

The second line of approximately 2,600 troops comprised, from right to left, the 3rd, 36th, 20th, 25th and the 59th/48th Regiments of Foot. The 8th, under James Wolfe of later Quebec fame, anchored the far left.

The third line consisted of the reserve, consisting of Pulteney's 13th Foot, Battereau's 62nd Foot, and lastly Blakeney's 27th Foot: 1,300 men in total. On each flank stood a squadron from Kingston's 10th Horse, numbering about 210 of all ranks. The remaining cavalry, situated on the comparatively drier ground on the left of the line, consisted of two regiments of dragoons (with

one squadron detached on reconnaissance duty) under Maj Gen Humphrey Bland, the whole numbering 485 men. To Bland's front stood the Culwhiniac enclosure, which he reckoned could be breached so that his cavalry brigade could pass through for the purpose of turning the Jacobite flank. As such a task would require infantry, Cumberland's second in command, Lt Gen Henry Hawley, ordered a battalion of loyal Highlanders to come forward to tear down portions of the walls.

Meanwhile, Lord George Murray, dissatisfied with the initial disposition of his units, chose to redeploy them, and accordingly advanced his troops down the moor to a new position about midway along the western wall of the Culwhiniac enclosure. After a number of alterations, Perth's and Glenbuchat's regiments came forward to the front line to occupy the extreme left in place of the MacDonalds, who were shifted nearly to the centre, together with John Roy Stuart's Regiment, which had also been sent forward. The front line now stood considerably strengthened, reaching a total of about 4,400 men.

With respect to artillery, the rebels deployed 11 guns, almost certainly 3-pounders, slightly in advance of their front line. A twelfth gun, probably a 4-pounder, arrived shortly thereafter.


As a result of Murray's redeployment, the front line of the rebel army had wheeled a short distance to its left, thus altering its axis of advance slightly to the north. As Cumberland naturally deduced that the Jacobites intended to concentrate their attack on the British right flank, which already faced opposing units that overlapped them, he brought forward two battalions – Pulteney's 13th Foot and Battersau's 62nd Foot – from the third line in order to extend the right of the first two lines. He also advanced two squadrons of the 10th Horse to protect the right flank, bolstered by another two troops of Cobham's 10th Dragoons. This now established Cumberland's front line at just under 3,100 of all ranks, as well as 300 cavalry, putting him at a substantial numerical disadvantage.

Before any shots were fired, Hawley had already begun moving his troopers through the gaps created in the Culwhiniac enclosure with a view to threatening the Jacobite flank, a course of action partly made possible by Murray posting his own cavalry in a sunken road near Culchunaig, thus inadvertently enabling Hawley to pass through the enclosure without resistance. Once clear of the parks, the dragoons then deployed on to an open slope, placing themselves not on the Jacobite flank but actually facing their rear, which obliged the rebels to bring up reinforcements, including four battalions from the regiments of Lord Lewis Gordon and Lord Ogilvy, Fitzjames's Horse and Lord Elcho's Lifeguards. Nevertheless, Hawley, established in a position which denied him a good view over the crest to his front, foolishly remained static, thus failing immediately to take advantage of his position.

The battle began at about 1pm when the rebels opened fire with their artillery, their cannonade inflicting light losses on Cumberland's men. The British guns, on the other hand, replied for less than ten minutes, some at maximum range. The soft, wet ground prevented the round shot from bounding across the surface after the first graze, such that many passed over the Jacobite front rank and landed in the rear, in most cases without inflicting harm. The maximum number of casualties suffered by the rebels probably did not exceed 100.

Notwithstanding the Jacobites' impatience to get to grips with their opponents, their commanders held their men in check, possibly out of a desire to await the arrival of stragglers, who continued to appear on the field after the previous night's dreadful march. Quite apart from individual Highlanders, several hundred men were yet to appear on the moor, their arrival expected imminently. Thus, a certain logic prevailed in the decision to postpone the assault, though after Hawley's cavalry emerged from the Culwhiniac enclosure and the British cannonade had commenced, further delay seemed ill advised, and within a few minutes the order to attack arrived, albeit only after the first messenger lost his head to a round shot.

THE BATTLE OF CULLODEN



Jacobite army

- 1 Glenarm's Regt.
- 2 Clanranald's Regt.
- 3 Keppoch's Regt.
- 4 Chisholm's Regt.
- 5 Macleans & Macdachsians
- 6 Monatrie's Regt.
- 7 Lady Mackintosh's Regt.
- 8 Lovat's Regt.
- 9 Stewart of Ardsheal's Regt.
- 10 Lochell's Regt.
- 11 Atholl Brigade
- 12 Irish Piquets
- 13 Duke of Perth's Regt.
- 14 Glenbuchat's Regt.
- 15 Kilmarnock's Footguards
- 16 John Roy Stuart's Regt.
- 17 Lord Ogilvy's Regt.
- 18 Royal Ecossons
- 19 Lord Lewis Gordon's Regt.
- 20 Bagnot & Strathellan
- 21 Shea
- 22 Fitzjames & Lifeguard
- 23 Etcho

■ Balvraid

Government forces

- A 271st (or Royal) Regt.
- B 34th (Choinmidey's) Foot
- C 14th (Price's) Foot
- D 21st (Campbell's) Royal Scots Fusiliers
- E 37th (Monro's) Foot
- F 4th (Barrell's) Foot
- G 3rd (Howard's) Foot (Bufis)
- H 36th (Fleming's) Foot
- I 20th (Bligh's) Foot
- J 25th (Sempill's) Foot
- K 59th/48th (Ligonier's) Foot
- L 8th (Wolfe's) Foot
- M 10th (Kingston's) Horse
- N 13th (Pulney's) Foot
- O 67th (Batterau's) Foot
- P 27th (Blakeney's) Foot
- Q 10th (Coburn's) Dragoons
- R 11th (Kerr's) Dragoons
- S Baltimore's Highland Battalion



Owing to the earlier redeployment, the Jacobite front line now stood somewhat skewed, with the right wing about 500 metres from Cumberland's position, but their left more than 700 metres' distance from the closest opposing troops. In an effort to realign the front line, a second messenger came forward to renew the order to charge. Riding first to the extreme left, he progressed down the front to speak to each unit's commander in turn until he reached Murray on the far right. The attack thereby commenced in echelon, presumably so as to ensure that the whole Jacobite line, despite its skewed formation, struck the British front rank more or less simultaneously.

At the same time, the three regiments of the Atholl Brigade, blocked by the presence of the Camerons to their front, found themselves unable to manoeuvre around the walls of the Leanach enclosure, whose bulge stood in their path. Instead, the Atholl men traversed this obstacle before charging headlong in the direction of Barrell's regiment. Meanwhile, the Camerons themselves found their own cohesion disturbed as they were pushed against the walls by Lady Mackintosh's Regiment shifting to the right, possibly in an effort to avoid boggy ground or artillery fire, together with the Frasers beside them.

Whatever the cause of the swerve, the units of the Jacobite right and centre became hopelessly entangled in one great mass which surged forward straight for Barrell's 4th Foot and Munro's 37th, positioned on the British far left, but not before Cumberland's guns had already exacted a fearful toll by tearing whole lanes through the rebel ranks. As the Highlanders came within range, the two regiments, together with the Royal Scots Fusiliers and possibly the 14th Foot, delivered a withering series of volleys from as many as 1,400 muskets. Munro's regiment is known to have opened fire at a mere 50 yards' distance, followed by another volley just before the Highlanders reached them. Casualties inflicted by small arms and canister shot – a tin filled with musket balls fired at short range so as to create a shotgun effect

OPPOSITE

The death of Major Gillies MacBean of Lady Mackintosh's Regiment, which occupied a position in the Jacobite centre at Culloden. (Chronicle / Alamy Stock Photo)



No. 1000. 1861.

L. Dickenson. Lith.

MAC BAIN.

MacBean

London. Published by Ackermann & Co. 96, Strand.

– are impossible to calculate accurately, but despite the infamous inaccuracy of the smoothbore weapons of the time, at close range they could be devastating. They caused heavy losses amidst the mass of Highlanders whose ranks had dissolved into a jumbled mob, resulting in confusion for those trying to negotiate over and around their fallen comrades. The effect of British fire almost certainly lent courage to the defenders, particularly after many of the rebels flung down their muskets in favour of their swords, so dispensing with the volley they had normally offered in reply in previous actions.

Rather than crumble at the intimidating sight before them, Barrell's and Munro's regiments stood fast, their 17-inch bayonets at the ready. Moving forward at a swift pace amidst shouts and curses, and wielding their broadswords, the Highlanders crashed into the two regiments, striking part of Monro's 37th and the leftmost regiment, Barrell's 4th. A fierce hand-to-hand action ensued in which the Jacobites suffered severe losses, proving at least the equality, if not the superiority, of musket and bayonet over broadsword and shield. One witness recorded that:

... the best of the clans ... made their strongest efforts to break them, but without effect, for the old Tangierines [Barrell's regiment] bravely repulsed these boasters, with a dreadful slaughter, and convinced them that the broad sword and target is unequal to the musket and bayonet, when in the hands of veterans, who are determined to use them – After the battle there was not a bayonet in this regiment but was either bloody or bent.

Barrell's regiment lost 17 killed and 108 wounded, including their commanding officer, from a total of 373 all ranks. Monro's fared slightly better, with 14 killed and 68 wounded, though since only part of that unit took part in repulsing the attack, it suffered comparatively greater losses than Barrell's.

This marked the climax of the battle. The British left had blunted the first attack and the Jacobites' system of

command stood in peril, with their officers, leading from the front, falling in large numbers, including several of their colonels. At the highest level, Murray himself failed to exercise proper tactical control and lost his horse in the fighting, a consequence of putting himself too far forward – into the fray with the forward elements – where he relegated himself to the role of a regimental or brigade commander unable to direct the battle as a whole. Moreover, by neglecting to maintain a tactical reserve he left himself unable to take advantage of the gaps created in the British line, whose ranks the Highlanders might well have forced further apart, precipitating a retreat and a decisive breakthrough. Munro's regiment had been split, and with further time and fresh reserves a thrust at this point – above all around its increasingly vulnerable flank – might have led to the collapse of Cumberland's front line – and possibly worse. In the event, Barrell's regiment offered such a magnificent defence as to allow

Culloden. France had failed to provide anything more than token assistance and in so doing denied the rebellion the vital aid it required. (steve-x-art / Alamy Stock Photo)



time for the second line to advance and come to its aid by providing destructive supporting fire at close range.

To strengthen the first line, Huske had ordered forward four regiments – more than 1,100 troops, plus the 20th Foot, which advanced to close the gap that had opened between the 25th and Munro's 37th. These five battalions now formed a horse-shoe-like formation, confronting the Jacobites from three sides, with Ligonier's 59th/48th Foot outflanking the left of the rebel line and then wheeling into the attack. The impetus of their charge halted by Barrell's 4th and Munro's 37th, the Jacobites now faced fresh units even while more of their own forces continued to come forward, converting a large concentration of men entirely without formation into a static mass whose rear ranks could not issue fire without harming those further forward. Meanwhile, as before, the British front rank produced a hedge of bayonets while from point blank range the second and third ranks poured several volleys into the struggling mass, now 20 to 30 men deep.

Having had his horse shot from under him and aware that momentum had been irretrievably lost, Murray extricated himself from the fray and proceeded to the rear to bring forward what supporting elements he might find; but by this stage almost nothing remained, for nearly the whole of the reserve had been sent either to oppose the looming danger represented by Hawley's cavalry near Culchunaig or to strengthen the Jacobite left.

On that sector, the clansmen began their charge at approximately the same time as the men on the right; but owing to their position – not parallel with their opponents – the Jacobites had about 200 metres further to traverse, and over considerably wetter ground – various accounts speaking of water up to their knees. The three MacDonald regiments duly advanced, sustaining heavy losses thanks to the musketry of the 13th and 2/Royals. To the MacDonalds' left, Perth's and Glenbuchat's men also went forward.

In the face of boggy ground and a terrible fusillade, the rebel advance on the left faltered several times at less than

100 metres from Cumberland's line, discharged their pistols and waved their swords, frustrated that their charge failed sufficiently to intimidate their opponents as to force them to flee. On the contrary – the British infantry kept up such a sustained series of volleys as to shoot down large numbers of the Chisholms, Macleans, MacLachlans and Farquharsons, including a disproportionate number of their officers, who so often occupied the front line. The Chisholms and Farquharsons both lost their colours, and with so many fallen leaders, Perth's and Glenbuchat's regiments began to retire, an action which soon prompted the MacDonalds to follow suit. Taking advantage of the moment, Cumberland galloped up to the two troops of Cobham's dragoons and with inspiring words ordered them forward. By the time they negotiated the same difficult ground which had impeded the Jacobite attack, many of the Highlanders were already well on their way to the Inverness road, but it is likely the dragoons hastened the speed of the collapse.

Thus far, Hawley had not committed his troopers to battle, instead watching the Jacobites on the crest to his front, where stood two battalions of Lord Ogilvy's Forfarshire Regiment, two under Lord Lewis Gordon, and two more under John Gordon and James Moir respectively, plus the Lifeguards and most of Fitzjames's Cavalrie. These units sought to guard the Jacobite right flank by standing opposite the six troops of Hawley's cavalry which charged up the slope. Although the Jacobites were already in the act of withdrawing, they still managed to offer a reasonably powerful volley, allowing many of their troops in this area to effect an escape without additional hindrance. Most of the fugitives, however, their retreat soon cut off by the British cavalry, faced no alternative but to flee down the road to Inverness, thus exposing themselves to troops disinclined to give quarter.

British losses amounted to 50 killed and 259 wounded, with almost 200 of the latter succumbing to their wounds shortly thereafter. Accurate figures for Jacobite casualties are impossible to tabulate, but the



Culloden, the final act of a remarkable period of British history, which brought a decisive end to clan power. (Photo by Ann Ronan Pictures/Print Collector/Getty Images)

general consensus suggests approximately 1,500 killed or wounded, about 150 taken prisoner, and over 200 officers and men from units in French service also captured. It is likely that government troops summarily killed large numbers of Jacobite wounded on the field, and there is no accounting for the number dispatched during the pursuit by cavalry along the road to Inverness.

The battle had lasted only 40 minutes, fought on the Jacobite side entirely by the Highlanders, for none of the Lowland regiments in the second line participated in the fighting, instead covering the retreat of those repulsed in the charge. The defeat of the Jacobites does not appear surprising given the difficulties both on the day and the previous night. Indeed, the enthusiasm they displayed at Culloden, under the circumstances, is all the more remarkable when all evidence pointed towards defeat. One could argue that Culloden was a foregone conclusion, for only a portion of Cumberland's army was required to bring the Jacobite forces to heel. Lochiel, for instance, struck by musket balls in both ankles, continued to encourage his men forward. MacDonald of Keppoch fell after two shots, but did so with sword and musket held high in defiance.

The numbers actually engaged at Culloden were quite small, for despite the presence of approximately 13,400 troops on the field, probably no more than 3,000 actually took part in the fighting. In Cumberland's army, two regiments in the first line, two in the second, and one in reserve, plus most of the Campbells, never fired a shot. Government forces paid a small price for their victory, whereas practically every Highlander who had fought in the front rank of his respective regiment was killed, either in the charge or when caught between enemy ranks which closed behind them, allowing the next rank to shoot down those who partly penetrated Cumberland's line.

It is perhaps appropriate here to note how Culloden has left in its wake certain persistent myths which ought to be dispelled. Culloden is still sometimes seen as a battle fought exclusively between English and Scots when this is certainly not the case. Of Cumberland's 15 regular regiments, three were Scottish; in addition, the companies of Lord Loudoun's regiment and those of the Duke of Argyll's militia were Scots as well. Nor is it the case that the worst atrocities committed after the

Culloden. For many clan chiefs the rebellion represented a means of holding back the forces of political and social change. (Chronicle / Alamy Stock Photo)





Much of the failure of the '45 may be attributed to the fact that Charles could only depend on a minority of Scots to support his cause. (Photo by: Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

battle were on the orders of English officers, for Lowland Scots were at least as responsible.

On the morning following the battle, the right wing of the Jacobite army joined Macpherson of Cluny with no more than 400 men of his clan near Loch Moy. Lord George Murray dispatched a messenger to the Prince, then at Gorthlick, about 20 miles away, informing him of the grim situation: he had the bulk of the army with him – about 1,500 men, most suffering from acute hunger – and that only Macpherson and Ardshiel could be accounted for among the chiefs. Stocks of food at Ruthven were poor, for despite Lord George's strenuous efforts to ensure that meal be sent to Badenoch in the event of a defeat, nothing in fact arrived.

Nevertheless, Culloden did not crush the hopes of all Jacobites, some of whom regarded it as a redeemable failure. At Ruthven in Badenoch, between 1,500 and 1,800 men gathered, together with the Duke of Perth, the Marquess of Tullibardine, Lord George Murray and Lord John Drummond, who collectively expressed a desire to carry on the fight. Within days a group of chiefs declared their willingness to raise further forces, reorganize those already under arms and renew the struggle.

The Prince, viewing the situation in a different light, believed the rebellion had collapsed and issued his last order, failing to accompany it with any words of gratitude for the sacrifices his followers had made: 'Let every man seek his own safety as best he can,' he declared, leaving Lord George Murray and Lord John Drummond to convey these sentiments. Chevalier de Johnstone recorded the break-up of the Jacobite forces:

Our separation at Ruthven was truly affecting. We bade one another an eternal adieu. No one could tell whether the scaffold would not be his fate. The Highlanders gave vent to their grief in wild howlings and lamentations; the tears flowed down their cheeks when they thought that their country was now at the discretion of the Duke of Cumberland, and on the point of being plundered; whilst they and their children would be reduced to slavery, and plunged, without resource into a state of remediless distress.

A good deal of bitterness was expressed by those officers who by their service to the Prince now found themselves in dreadful straits. They and thousands of others had risked everything on an enterprise which while regarded by most from the beginning as unlikely to succeed, arose for the most part out of virtuous principle – loyalty to their monarch, a wish for an independent Scotland and an end to government corruption in Edinburgh.



THE WORLD AROUND WAR

Highland life in the mid-18th century

To the English and to most Lowland Scots, the Highlands of Scotland were a remote and backward place populated by semi-barbaric peoples speaking an unintelligible language, who wore animal hides or lengths of patterned cloth, and who continued practices long since abandoned in the more civilized south: vendetta killings, feuds, forays, and cattle-stealing. If the English – with the Highlands 400 miles from London – were clearly ignorant of the Highlanders, even their near-neighbours, the Lowlanders, viewed them with suspicion and sometimes fear. Duncan Forbes, Lord President of the Court of Session, the government's adviser on Highland affairs, described the area thus:

What is properly called the Highlands of Scotland is that large tract of mountainous Ground to the Northwest of the Forth and the Tay, where the natives speak the Irish language. The inhabitants stick close to their ancient and idle way of life; retain their barbarous customs and maxims; depend generally on their Chiefs as their Sovereign Lords and masters; and being accustomed to the use of Arms, and inured to hard living, are dangerous to the public peace; and must continue to be so until, being deprived of Arms for some years, they forget the use of them.

The Highlanders lived a feudal existence based on a tribal system dating back hundreds of years, with ties of blood, name, loyalty and centuries of shared experience in close-knit communities which inexorably bound the members of the clan together. It was a way of life rendered the more powerful by its characteristic features: its distinctive language, music, formidable geography, and military traditions, all of which provided the region and its people with a strong identity not found anywhere else in Britain. While the Age of Enlightenment swept across England and the Scottish Lowlands, the Highlands, virtually frozen in medieval isolation, still awaited the onslaught of modernity. Thus, unsurprisingly, what passed for sophistication in the Lowlands equated to weakness and effeminacy in the mountains of the North, where the Highlanders looked down upon their southern neighbours as a corrosive influence, as Dr Samuel Johnson related in his account of the region:

By their Lowland neighbours they would not willingly be taught [English]; for they have long considered them as a mean and degenerate race. These prejudices are wearing fast away; but so much of them still remains, that when I asked a very learned minister in the islands, which they considered as their most savage clans: ‘Those,’ said he, ‘that live next [to] the Lowlands.’

By mid-century such attitudes were undergoing change – partly owing to the military roads built by Wade between 1726 and 1737, which allowed greater access of people and ideas to a most inaccessible region, and partly by the slow influence of the political and social changes occurring to the south.

Not every outsider regarded Highlanders with unmixed contempt. A Mr Pennant, whom Daniel Defoe quotes in his travel journal, found Highlanders

... indolent to a high degree, unless roused to war, or to any animating amusement; or, I may say from experience, to

lend any disinterested assistance to the distressed traveller, either in directing him on his Way, or affording their aid in passing the dangerous torrents of the Highlands. They are hospitable to the highest degree, and full of generosity; are much affected with the civility of strangers, and have in themselves natural politeness and address, which often flows from the meanest [i.e. lowest socially] when least expected... They are excessively inquisitive after your business, your name, and other particulars of little consequence to them. They are most curious after the politics of the world, and when they can procure an old newspaper, will listen to it [read to them] with... avidity... They have much pride, and consequently are impatient of affronts, and revengeful of injuries; are decent in their general behaviour, inclined to superstitions, yet attentive to the duties of religion, and are capable of giving a most distinct account of their faith.

Nothing more readily marked out a Highlander than his appearance. An observer named Edward Burt, quoted by Defoe, described their peculiar form of dress:

The common habit of the Highlander is far from being acceptable to the eye. With them a small part of the plaid, which is not so large as the former, is set in folds and girt round the waist to make of it a short petticoat that reaches halfway down the thigh, the rest is brought over the shoulders and fastened before, below the neck often with a fork, and sometimes with a bodkin or sharpened piece of stick, so that they make pretty nearly the appearance of the poor women of London when they bring their gowns over their heads to shelter themselves from the rain. This dress is called the *quelt* [kilt], and for the most part they wear the petticoat so very short that in a windy day, going up a hill, or stooping, the indecency of it is plainly discovered.

To understand this society, one must understand the social structure of the clan, which Forbes described as

... a set of men all bearing the same surname, and believing themselves to be related the one to the other, and to

be descended from the same common stock. In each clan there are several subaltern tribes, who own their dependence on their own immediate chiefs but all agree in owing allegiance to the Supreme Chief of the Clan or Kindred and look upon it to be their duty to support him at all adventures.

The chief effectively dispensed justice and interpreted the law that governed his clan, which meant that, like in so many remote communities with ancient traditions, nothing like proper government jurisdiction permeated into their region. As a consequence, enforcement of the law had long since devolved upon the clan chiefs, in whose hands the distant government placed any hopes for a civilizing influence in an otherwise barbaric community. What the authorities could not achieve themselves, they deduced, might be achieved through intermediaries. ‘It has been for a great many years impracticable (and hardly thought safe to try it)’ Forbes observed,

to give the Law its course among the mountains. It required no small degree of Courage, and a greater degree of power than men are generally possessed of, to arrest an offender or debtor in the midst of his Clan. And for this reason it was that the Crown in former times was obliged to put Sheriffships and other Jurisdictions in the hands of powerful families in the Highlands, who by their respective Clans and following could give execution to the Laws within their several territories, and frequently did so at the expense of considerable bloodshed.

Long before, the Crown had ennobled many chiefs, who became the unofficial agents of the law and royal authority, over time extending their wealth and power through increased landholdings and more tenants – and thus more men-at-arms – which was consistent with the feudal traditions which had long since ended in the rest of Britain. Indeed, clan chiefs effectively operated as laws unto themselves, with one oft-repeated anecdote confirming the fact.



One observer described the Highlands as 'Long tracts of mountainous desert, covered with dark heath, and often obscured by misty weather, narrow vallies thinly inhabited, and bounded by precipices...' (Photo by National Galleries of Scotland/Getty Images)

A woman stood accused of stealing money from the chief of her clan, MacDonald of Clanranald. It would not have occurred to anyone to take her before a court in Inverness or anywhere else for that matter; the chief condemned her to death by ordering her hair to be tied to seaweed among the rocks along the coast. In due course the tide rose and drowned her. With the chief the unquestioned master of the clan, a crime committed against him amounted to a crime committed against the clan as a whole, and hence no dissent arose. He also wielded enough power to burn the roof of a recalcitrant clansman's sod-and-roundstone cottage, especially if he refused to answer the call to arms, or he could banish convicted members of his clan to indentured servitude in Canada or America.

Burt, something of an amateur sociologist, identified the unique relationship between clansmen and their chief:

The ordinary Highlanders esteem it the most sublime degree of virtue to love their chief and pay him a blind obedience although it be in opposition to the government, the laws of the kingdom, or even the law of God. He is

their idol; and as they profess to know no king but him...
so will they say they ought to do whatever he commands.

But if the chief dispensed justice, he also protected his people and took a strong, paternalistic interest in their welfare. The loyalties between chief and clansmen were mutual, and this created the cohesive bond that rendered the clan a powerful communal institution. The chief's responsibilities ran to officiating disputes over property and other issues, for which he sometimes consulted with leading members of the clan. Notwithstanding his powerful position as landlord, judge, military commander and father of the tribe, he seldom ruled absolutely.

Officially, Highland chiefs did not owe their authority to the principle of hereditary right; but over the centuries this largely became the *de facto* situation. Where once, back in the mists of time, the land was communally owned, by the mid-18th century it was the chief's – not by virtue of a deed, but by the clan's tacit recognition that by tradition he occupied the top rung of the hierarchy. This and other aspects of the Highland social system had remained intact for centuries, such as the mystic bond between unrelated male infants sharing the same mother's milk. The son of a chief was often wet-nursed by a woman of lower status within the clan, a tradition which bound the boy by honour to that woman's own son, whereby, in boyhood, each pledged to defend the life of the other, even while wide social divisions separated their respective families.

Beneath the clan chief lay a host of various officials, with tenants beneath them. The wealthier of these tenants managed land held under 'tacks' or leases, which the chief granted them as subordinate landlords. These 'tacksman', though unrelated to the chief himself, nevertheless played an important part in Highland society, and in time of emergency a tacksman's status enabled him to occupy a higher place in the clan regiment – serving as a junior officer or senior NCO – than the humbler tenants working the land. Needless to

say, a time of ‘emergency’ occurred whenever the chief decreed it to be so.

Some clans could muster perhaps a hundred or so broadswords, others several thousand. In all, the total fighting strength of all the Highland clans by the middle of the 18th century amounted to at least 32,000 men (including loyal clansmen). It was well for George II that the entire military might of the mountains did not unite, for if a mere 6,000 marched into the north of England in 1745, producing turmoil in London, one can only presume that an army five times its strength would easily have prevailed. But tradition, ancient feuds, differences in religion and varied political allegiances rendered impossible any sense of common purpose, not least when all these factors are seen in the context of clans often living remotely from one another – as islands unto themselves, quite literally in some cases.

But whatever the cause for which the clan was called out, the chief led it in battle, by right but also by his followers’ expectation, for he was the patriarch. The clan gained inspiration from him and the warlike traditions and valorous conduct of its forebears. It relished combat and its concomitant fulfilment of tradition and expression of manhood. In battle it did not merely fight as a unit; father and son, brother and brother fought side-by-side, drawing inspiration from the bravery and hardiness of the others. Everyone occupied his place in the line and held a rank according to his family’s status within the clan. The chief served as the colonel, his brothers the equivalents of majors and captains, and the head of each family assumed the role of an officer or NCO. Everyone else filled the ranks, their bonnets bearing the symbol of the clan – a sprig of heather, oak, gale or myrtle – with the most prominent men towards the front, those lowest in the food chain finding themselves progressively further back.


In the fury of action, always accompanied by a piper, the Highlander cried out his clan’s slogan, which exhorted the men to close with the enemy in a savage,

furious onslaught marked by a panoply of weapons unique to the region, as Defoe described during his time there:

Their ancient arms were the Lochaber ax... It is a tremendous weapon, better to be expressed by a figure than words. They likewise used the broad sword and target: with the latter they covered themselves, and with the first reached their enemies at a great distance. These were their ancient weapons: but, since the disarming act, they are scarcely met with. Partly owing to that, and partly to the spirit of industry now arising among them, the Highlanders, in a few years, will scarcely know the use of any weapon... The dirk was a sort of dagger stuck in the belt. The... arm-pit dagger, was worn there ready to be used on coming to close quarters. These, with a pistol stuck in their girdle, completely armed the Highlanders.

18th-century Highland chief Norman Macleod of Clan Macleod, Isle of Skye, wearing tartan trews. (Photo by Culture Club/Getty Images)

If the English viewed Highlanders as irredeemably uncivilized, they were hard-pressed to apply their prejudices to the chiefs themselves, who not only spoke English as well as (Scots) Gaelic but often acquired facility in French from a tutor or through travel on the Continent. A chief might boast knowledge of the classics and ensure that his sons received a good education not merely in Scotland – perhaps in Edinburgh or Glasgow – but in the great cities of Europe. He may have known how to dance a Highland reel, but he was also familiar with the more genteel practices in the south, appreciated French wine and



dressed with a view to preserving his Highland identity, but without ignoring symbols of wealth and status like lace around his cuffs and collar. Defoe recognized what others among his countrymen failed to appreciate: that not every Highlander was by definition a thief and a rogue: ‘We see every day,’ he observed

... gentlemen born here ... who are named among the clans as if they were Barbarians, appear at Court and in our Camps and Armies, as polite and as finished gentlemen as any from other countries, or even among our own, and if I should say, outdoing our own in many things, especially in arms and gallantry as well as abroad as at home.

He also lived a lifestyle akin in many ways to his southern counterparts, spending time hunting the rich quarry of stags, wolves and wildcats which populated the glens and watered at the lochs.

The Highland economy naturally reflected the hardness of the geography and the harshness of the region’s climate. The glens, characterized by relatively little soil covering rocky ground, offered a correspondingly scarce yield. As Defoe observed, ‘By the small proportion of arable land in these parts to the rocks and heaths, the most plentiful year scarce produces sufficient to feed the inhabitants; and consequently, in an unfavourable season, they suffer extreme distress’. This rendered cattle-herding one of the few viable pastoral pursuits. The animals, like the people, came from hardy stock: black, shaggy cows, unlikely looking creatures which bore up wonderfully against their harsh environment, as well as sheep and goats.

The dearth of agriculture and a dependence on animals goes far in explaining the Highlanders’ military traditions. Living remote lives with nothing but their herds to keep starvation at bay, clansmen by necessity learned to handle arms to protect their livelihoods, fending off raiders in the absence of any authorized individual to uphold the law. Over time some clansmen applied these skills to more nefarious purposes and took to stealing from their neighbours. The cycle of robbery



and violence which followed established and entrenched a culture of honour; to Lowlanders and the English, this was little more than brigandage, whereas to the Highlanders, disputes between clans grew into clashes on a considerable scale, sometimes involving individuals armed with dirk and sword in deadly single combat, or occasionally clashes between entire clans. Over time clans set deeds of heroism and tales of long-standing rivalry to music and poetry, reinforcing tribal loyalty, unity and separateness. ‘Vocal music,’ Defoe observed, ‘was very much in vogue among them, and their songs were chiefly in praise of their ancient heroes.’

Deer and stags on the mountainous terrain of Glencoe. (Photo by Buyenlarge/Getty Images)

Such were the people on whom the Stuart cause chiefly relied for its support – but a people whose mixed loyalties and motives denied Prince Charles Edward the full weight of their numbers. Those mixed loyalties, some to the Stuarts, others to the Hanoverians, may be traced to many issues. The Stuarts, having been Scottish kings as recently as 60 years before (King James II having been James Edward Stuart's grandfather), appealed to many Highlanders on the basis of cultural identity alone, for to them there was more natural justice in lending support to a dynasty with Scottish, rather than German, roots. Clansmen well understood the notion put forward by Charles Edward of rights illegitimately denied him, for the concept of the rights and privileges associated with a chief's power over his clan closely mirrored that of a hereditary king. When that king simultaneously promised a solution to the one great political problem about which even the most isolated Highland clansman would voice his opinion – the perceived betrayal of his nation via the Act of Union – the albeit limited appeal of the Stuart call to arms becomes apparent. Religion also played its part; Catholic clans tended to side with the Jacobite cause, together with many Episcopalians whose clergy had long before refused automatically to transfer their loyalty from one dynastic ruler to the next, rejecting the oath of allegiance to the Hanoverian line. Thus, no Highlander can be said to have fought out of a single motive: some for religion, others for a political persuasion, but most out of nothing more complex than tribal loyalty.



CONCLUSION AND CONSEQUENCES

The aftermath of the rebellion was replete with brutality and wanton destruction. Cumberland treated the Scots as a whole as a conquered people, carrying out purges across Inverness-shire and elsewhere for several weeks after Culloden, leaving desolation over a wide area. In a campaign for which the term ‘fire and sword’ genuinely applies, government forces destroyed large amounts of food and put to the torch religious structures – Catholic and non-juring Episcopal meeting houses and priests’ houses – in a spirit of vengeance and recrimination. Determined to rid the Highlands of all vestiges of resistance, present and future, Cumberland ordered Loudoun to drive off thousands of head of cattle, destroy the ploughs of suspected Jacobite supporters and burn the houses of their leaders. Even when clan after clan surrendered to advancing troops, their submission never guaranteed mercy. The list of atrocities extends too far for any detailed treatment here.

Surviving Jacobite officers generally fled abroad into exile, their lands forfeited to the Crown after being plundered and burnt. Those rebels who refused to submit found their estates subject to punitive expeditions, leading to the systematic devastation of the country still under the control of the western clans. Even where clansmen submitted and handed weapons

in, the suspicions of the authorities often lingered, for many surrendered arms appeared obsolete or rusted, indicating that in fact their serviceable counterparts remained hidden. Cumberland's merciless campaign extended even to the innocent on a number of occasions, when troops harassed those clans that had taken no part in the rebellion and even some known to be loyal to the government. Many fugitives, some harbouring Jacobite sympathies and others not, took to the hills where many died of exposure and starvation. Summary justice and atrocities plagued the Highlands for months, with men arbitrarily shot and their wives and daughters raped.

In the aftermath of the rebellion, many tribunals were established throughout the country to try prisoners, some taken in arms and others accused of aiding the rebel forces. After summary trials, convicts went to the gallows, usually a few dozen a day in cities like London, York, Edinburgh, Carlisle and many other places in England and Scotland. The great majority of prisoners were, however, transported to the plantations of the New World. Some died of hunger and disease while awaiting deportation, in transit or in prison awaiting trial, especially those in prison hulks.

Of the most prominent captured rebels, several peers were beheaded and hundreds of commoners hanged. Nevertheless, most Jacobite prisoners had their lives spared, largely under an arbitrary form of justice by which prisoners drew lots and only every 20th man stood trial. Most so peculiarly chosen were found guilty and condemned to death, but in nearly every instance the sentence was commuted to transportation for life as indentured labour. Those not brought to trial could petition for mercy, so long as they pleaded guilty to high treason, in which case they potentially found themselves sharing the same fate as those who were actually convicted before a court, summary or otherwise.

Thus, the fates of Jacobite prisoners remained largely uniform in this bizarre form of justice, under which about a thousand men were transported and another 200 exiled and banned from ever returning. About 900



Prince Charles in hiding. He moved around the western Highlands and islands regularly during his months in seclusion. (Mary Evans Picture Library/DOUGLAS MCCARTHY)

further prisoners received their liberty under the Act of Indemnity of 1747, with nearly 400 more having been exchanged for prisoners of war in French captivity. Thus, of the approximately 3,500 Jacobite prisoners whom the official records identify by name, only the fates of about 650 remain mysterious. In all probability, they died in captivity from starvation and disease.

So much for the rank and file of the movement: the fates of the principal Jacobite leaders also demonstrate how completely the rebellion collapsed. As discussed, in the aftermath of Culloden the Prince went on the run, moving from place to place in the western Highlands and islands, with a bounty of £30,000 for anyone able to turn him over to the authorities. He lived on the generosity of a handful of faithful supporters, such as Flora MacDonald (see [page 128](#)). On 20 September 1746 the Prince finally went into exile, boarding the unfortunately named vessel *L'Heureux*, which conveyed him to France. It was the last time he was ever to see Scotland, and he would live another 42 years. He remained away from Rome until his father died in January 1766. In time Charles Edward grew more morose, doleful and guilty over the fate that had befallen his faithful Highlanders. As an old man he dissolved into rages if asked about the rebellion, and the Young Pretender ultimately became a sullen, bitter,

FLORA MACDONALD (1722–90) JACOBITE HEROINE

Flora MacDonald's story has often veered into the fanciful thanks to the growth of legend. Her association with the rebellion emerged after Culloden when the Prince went into hiding on South Uist, the home of her brother and the principal local clan, the Clanranalds, who sympathized with the Jacobite cause. When the government discovered that Charles had fled to the Outer Hebrides, troops were sent to search the islands. The Prince fled inland with two companions, hiding in a shepherd's hut on the west coast of Uist. There his friends developed a plan to smuggle him back to Skye disguised as an Irish maid in Flora's employ.

Thus disguised, the Prince proceeded across country alive with government troops, before crossing first to the island of Wiay and then to Benbecula. The group sheltered for three nights in a barn before sailing in a small boat to Skye on the night of 28/29 June. On 1 July, Charles bade Flora farewell, soon thereafter leaving Scotland forever aboard a French ship which had managed to elude the many Royal Navy vessels endeavouring to prevent his escape to the Continent.

The boatmen who conveyed Charles to Skye were arrested, and Flora's whereabouts was discovered, but she never revealed sufficient information to assist the authorities in locating the Prince. She was imprisoned until shortly after the government announced a general amnesty in July 1746.



Prince Charles bids farewell to Flora MacDonald at Portree, on the Isle of Skye, in June 1746. (Photo by The Print Collector/Getty Images)

withdrawn alcoholic. Nevertheless, history has tended to look kindly upon him, emphasizing his youthful energy and adventurous side, leaving little to popular memory other than his character as the 'Bonnie Prince'. He died in Rome in 1788, a century after William of Orange had landed in England to replace Charles's grandfather on the throne. With his death the last embers of hope for the Jacobite cause also died; for although he left behind him a brother, Henry, Cardinal of York, he died in 1807 without an heir. By this time over six decades had passed since Culloden without any Jacobite stirrings of any importance.

Lord George Murray never saw the Prince again after the campaign. He hid for eight months in Glenartney before fleeing abroad, travelling through Holland and Italy before establishing himself in exile in Germany. He travelled widely and died in Holland in 1760. Lord John Drummond died of fever in Holland in 1747, while Lord Ogilvy, after a time in hiding at Loch Wharral in Glen Clova, made for Norway and then travelled to France, where he joined the army and became a general, in time re-establishing himself in Scotland and dying in 1803. Lord Elcho fled to France, his estates and title later forfeited by an Act of Attainder. He served for many years in the army of Louis XV and died in Paris in 1787. Lord Pitsligo, who had hidden with Elcho in Glenshee, remained in seclusion in Scotland, as did Macpherson of Cluny, who remained sequestered on Ben Alder for nine years before leaving Scotland forever. Lord Lewis Gordon went into exile to France, went insane, and died in 1756.

Lochiel, who had assisted the Prince as he wandered, managed also to reach the safety of France, joining the Bourbon army like many of his compatriots, including Clanranald, Lochgarry and others. He died in 1748. Archibald Cameron, his brother, was executed in 1753 and appears to have been the last man to die in the cause of the '45. The Earl of Kilmarnock and Lords Balmerino and Lovat also died on the scaffold. The Earl of Cromarty, although found guilty, was pardoned by the intervention

NEXT PAGES

Execution by beheading of Jacobite leaders at the Tower of London. Lord Balmerino and the Earl of Kilmarnock met their fate in this manner. (Photo by Museum of London/ Heritage Images/ Getty Images)

The Beheading of the R



*At this sad Scene which Blood must deeply stain,
Scarce can the pitying Eye the Tear restrain:
But the same Instant call to mental Sight,
Those Heroes bleeding in their Country's Right;*

*The Kings Troops under the Command of the Valiant Duke of Cum
April 1746, Kill'd 1000 in y^e Field of Battle, 1500 in y^e pursuit, & took 500 M^o.
the Earl, Balmorino, y^e Earl of Cromartie was taken 7 day before at y^e Bar
grand Jury, found a true bill against them 23 June, & they were brought
being seated y^e bill of Indictment was read, y^e Earl of Kilmarock & Cromartie
brought again to y^e Bar, when Kilmarock & Cromartie made speeches to d^e
arrest of Judgment y^e High, Tennant refused him Council, but on Aug^o 1^o he with
Balmorino were executed the 18 of August.*

Rebel Lords on Great Tower Hill.



Scotland, having totally defeated y^e Rebels, at Culloden, on y^e 16 of
 prisoners among which was y^e Earl of Kilmarnock, & a few days after
 title of y^e people by y^e L^d Rae, & were brought to y^e Tower May 29, the
 16 July 28, to Westminster Hall, where y^e L^d High Steward & y^e Peers
 pleaded guilty, Balmorino pleaded not guilty. On y^e 30th they were
 dispose y^e Lords to intercede for mercy, Balmorino having mov'd in
 draw his plea, & they all receiv'd sentence of death, Kilmarnock and

Intrepid Gard'ner and each brave Monro,
 We check the Grief, & think the Axe too slow.
 One Briton, who for sacred Freedom falls,
 For a whole Hoatomb of Rebels calls.

Printed for Rob^t Wilkinson, 59 Cornhill.

Price 6^d

of the Princess of Wales. The Marquess of Tullibardine, imprisoned in the Tower, did not suffer the indignities of a public execution, for he died of an illness.

In the months which followed Culloden the government in London enacted legislation to stamp out disaffection in the Highlands as vigorously as possible. By the Act of Attainder, aimed at those who played the most prominent part in the rebellion, 41 people were found guilty of high treason. Amongst other pieces of legislation was the Disarming Act, which banned possession of weapons of any kind, as well as punitive legislation against Episcopalians, as so many had supported the Prince. Only small numbers of Episcopalians were allowed to congregate together; their ministers had to take Oaths of Allegiance and Abjuration; notices fixed to church doors indicated that they had submitted to these requirements; and various penalties were decreed, which denied civil rights or imposed prison terms on those who failed to name George II as the king in their prayers, lest it be construed that Charles Edward Stuart constituted the legitimate sovereign. Other forms of legislation against the Episcopalian Church were enacted and not repealed until 1792, while legislation against the Catholic Church imposed harsh measures as well, concerning the right of inheritance and property bequest and other matters of family law.

Many of the military roads begun by Wade before the rebellion were extended, rendering the Highlands more easily patrolled by small detachments of troops from the regular army or the militia. In time these roads covered almost 1,200 miles, passing over even the most inaccessible regions of the Highlands. In addition, further barracks were constructed, Fort Augustus was repaired and new fortifications erected, most notably Fort George, which took over 20 years to finish. Thousands of troops were dispatched to garrison the Highlands, and the independent companies were disbanded, though they were revived in 1760 during the Seven Years' War (1756–63) with France, and would later be incorporated into the Highland



regiments raised for service in Canada, the West Indies and the Continent as part of the regular army. In fact, herein lay the seeds not of reconciliation, perhaps, but of reintegration, for several such regiments were recruited, at once raising the strength of the regular forces and ensuring an outlet for any remaining clan disaffection while at the same time making good use of the Highlanders' martial abilities. By the end of the century 27 regiments of Highlanders had been created for the regular army, with another 19 battalions of militia serving as a reserve – over 30,000 men in total. The integration of the Highlanders into the regular ranks of the British Army did much to soothe the legacy of animosity that remained after 1746 and bring this formerly remote region more closely into the mainstream of British society.

The destruction of clan power involved forcible evictions and clearances from the Highlands, ending the feudal way of life. (Photo by The Print Collector/Getty Images)



The Black Watch assault the French position at Fort Ticonderoga on 8 July 1758, during the Seven Years' War. Large numbers of Scots, including Highlanders, continued to serve in the British Army notwithstanding the consequences of the rebellion. (SuperStock / Alamy Stock Photo)

Culloden represented more than the collapse of the rebellion; it symbolized the end of the Highlanders' way of life. Their defeat signified the end of their struggle to support a Stuart claimant and the euphemistically named 'pacification of the Highlands' destroyed forever much of what made their region distinctive. It constituted more than merely turning much of the area desolate through farm-burning and the wholesale destruction of livestock and crops. In addition to the disarming of the clans, legislation passed at Westminster also abolished the system of heritable jurisdiction, by which Scottish lairds had administered the law on their own estates. Even the Highland national costume was banned, and this was not lifted until 1782.

The balance between progressive and reactionary forces in the Highlands shifted dramatically after 1745, as a result of the government's deliberate policies. The government abolished hereditary jurisdictions, which although affected all of Scotland, had a particularly

profound impact on the Highlands; chiefs lost most of their principal powers over their clansmen, weakening the bonds of the system by striking at the heart of their authority. In addition to this, quite apart from those chiefs held prisoner after Culloden, most of the others had fled abroad and their lands were forfeited. They left their clansmen to make the best life they could as tenants of new landlords with no regard for the old ways.

This general exodus did, however, leave room for those landowners loyal to the Hanoverians – or who at least were not overtly hostile and were willing to adapt to new ways. Many tried their hand at new forms of improvement for their agriculture, often with poor results. Whether the post-1745 Acts merely accelerated change or instigated it, by the end of the century Highland chiefs had become akin to their Lowland counterparts, with their former role of patriarch of the clan replaced by one in which care for one's property as a landowner took priority over meeting the needs of the clan.

The clan system could not bear up to such fundamental changes and within a generation it may be said to have died out. Nor was this the end of the process of change in the Highlands, which underwent rapid and fundamental social and economic change, not least owing to the Highland Clearances of the end of the 18th century and the early 19th, during which thousands of people were forced off the land in favour of sheep.

If the Jacobites failed to achieve their objective, history at least has looked kindly upon them, for most pursued the cause with little in the way of personal benefit on their minds. Few fought purely out of allegiance to the House of Stuart, but instead, a more general loyalty to their accepted sovereigns – clan and Crown – was the reason most took the field, and they knew that the risks involved in defeat carried with them the ultimate penalty. For this they sought to conquer three kingdoms, with little in their arsenal beyond courage and conviction. Had the government's incompetent strategy for defending England against invasion failed more dramatically, the rebellion might have survived longer, but ultimately the cause was lost.

Oddly, had no fears existed that a Stuart restoration would entail a return to the despotism associated with James II's reign and the arbitrary powers he exercised, the Jacobite cause of his grandson, Charles Edward, might very well have found widespread support across Britain, for the Hanoverians, who came to power 30 years before the '45, could hardly be said to enjoy wide popularity. Only in the latter days of the reign of George III (1760–1820) did the dynasty enjoy general respect.

The great paradox of the 1745 Rebellion was that the men of the losing side, the 'barbarian' Highland clans whose way of life was destroyed in its wake, would in time be seen in a romantic light; noble and ever loyal, for they never betrayed their Prince despite the generous price on his head. The reputation of the Highlands became further enhanced in the latter part of the century when, after faithful service in the ranks of the British Army first against the American revolutionaries (1775–83) and then the French between 1793 and 1815, they not only lost their pariah status but reinvented themselves as some of the most distinguished troops in Georgian service.

Radicalism from France, followed by the still greater threat of Napoleonic expansionism, permanently eradicated any remaining concerns over a renewed Jacobite threat. Indeed, a period of wholesale Celtic revivalism began with George IV's visit to Edinburgh in 1822, when the Hanoverian king wore Highland dress. This process may be said to have been completed by Queen Victoria's regular visits to Balmoral and her genuine fondness for the Highlands. Thus, the social and economic trends which had already begun to transform the rest of Britain in 1746 received a dramatic impetus with the collapse of the Jacobite Rebellion and the reforms undertaken by the government in its aftermath. By the end of the century the Highlands had undergone a radical transformation; and by the reign of Victoria they had achieved an aura of romanticism which cast the Jacobite cause – now safely at a distance – in a sympathetic light.

CHRONOLOGY

- 1745
- 5 July Prince Charles Edward Stuart sails for Scotland from Belle Isle
- 9 July Naval encounter between *L'Elisabeth* and HMS *Lion*
- 25 July Prince lands at Loch nan Uamh in Arisaig
- 6 August Prince writes to Louis XV requesting assistance
- 19 August Standard of revolt raised at Glenfinnan; clans begin to assemble
- 21–29 August Prince proceeds east, moving between Forts William and Augustus; General Cope, commander of government forces in Scotland, marches north from Stirling for Fort Augustus before changing direction and marching to Inverness
- 27 August Rendezvous at Aberchaldar
- 29 August Jacobites fail to take Ruthven Barracks
- 30 Aug–4 Sep Prince marches to Blair Castle and Perth, receives reinforcements and appoints Lord George Murray and the Duke of Perth joint commanders; Cope marches from Inverness to Aberdeen to ship his troops to Edinburgh
- 17 September Cope disembarks troops at Dunbar; Jacobites occupy Edinburgh, but the castle remains in government possession
- 21 September Jacobite victory in the battle of Prestonpans
- 25 September Jacobites occupy Aberdeen
- October Charles's army exceeds 5,000 men; Duke of Cumberland and some of his forces recalled from Flanders for service against the Jacobites; Field Marshal Wade assembles troops at Newcastle; new regiments raised and militia called out; loyal Highland clans form new regiments
- 7 October French vessel runs the blockade and lands arms at Montrose; further ships arrive with weapons by the end of the month
- 31 October Jacobite army proceeds south from Edinburgh with a view to sparking a sympathetic uprising in England and encouraging a French landing in support
- 10–15 November Siege of Carlisle; garrison of militia capitulates on 15th
- 20 November Jacobite forces march south from Carlisle towards

- Manchester via Preston but fail to recruit substantial numbers
- 24 November French troops land at Montrose
- 25 November HMS *Hazard* surrenders to the French and Jacobites at Montrose
- 26 November Lord John Drummond and Scottish troops in French service disembark at Montrose; Irish troops land at Peterhead and Aberdeen
- 29 November Jacobites occupy Manchester
- 1–4 December Main Jacobite army moves west while Murray conducts a feint to the west; he succeeds in attracting Cumberland towards Stafford, then rejoins Charles in Derby
- 4 December Jacobites enter Derby
- 6 December With no evidence of a revolt by English Jacobites or a French invasion, Charles orders a retreat to Scotland
- 8–16 December Retreat proceeds towards Penrith via Wigan and Kendal; Duke of Cumberland pursues and Wade seeks to intercept, but fails to catch Jacobites at Wigan; Lord Loudoun occupies Inverness
- 18 December Engagement at Clifton
- 20 December Jacobite army enters Scotland, leaving a garrison in Carlisle Castle
- 21–30 December Jacobites unsuccessfully defend Carlisle
- 23 December Government troops defeated at Inverurie
- 25 December Jacobites reach Glasgow
- 30 December Carlisle surrenders to Cumberland, who then returns to London, leaving General Hawley to pursue Charles's army
- 1746
- 4 January Charles's forces join with those under Lord John Drummond
- 7–8 January Siege of Stirling; town capitulates to the Jacobites but castle remains in government hands
- 8–31 January Jacobites continue the siege of Stirling; General Hawley concentrates his force at Edinburgh, combining with the garrison already in situ and Wade's troops from Newcastle
- 14 January Hawley marches to relieve Stirling via Linlithgow and Falkirk; Murray moves against Hawley, leaving a small force in vicinity of Stirling
- 17 January Battle of Falkirk

- 18–28 January Jacobites make no inroads at the siege of Stirling and many desert; Cumberland proceeds north to assume command in Scotland
- 1 February Prince retreats with his army into the Highlands for the winter; Ruthven Barracks surrender
- 4 February Cumberland pursues Jacobite army north; Loudoun fortifies Inverness
- 6 February Cumberland reaches Perth but obliged to halt by adverse weather
- 16 February Lord Loudoun fails in attempt to capture Charles in a night raid at Moy Castle
- 18 February Advancing Jacobites oblige Loudon to abandon Inverness
- 19–20 February Jacobite army concentrates in and around Inverness
- 27 February Cumberland reaches Aberdeen but halts to await improved weather
- 3–5 March Siege of Fort Augustus; garrison capitulates
- 10–31 March Jacobites unsuccessfully besiege Blair Castle
- 20 March Skirmish at Dornoch; skirmish at Keith
- 20 March–2 April Siege of Fort William, which Jacobites fail to take
- 8 April Cumberland marches from Aberdeen
- 12 April Government forces cross the river Spey and fight the Jacobite rearguard at Nairn on the 14th
- 15 April Jacobites fail to surprise government camp at Nairn
- 16 April Battle of Culloden
- 18 April Charles's forces disperse at Fort Augustus and Ruthven Barracks
- 19 April Remaining French units lay down their arms
- April (post-Culloden)
to September Cumberland brutally suppresses all remaining pockets of resistance; the government executes many prisoners, but transports most to North American colonies; loyal forces search unsuccessfully for Charles across the western Highlands and islands
- 27 May Last Jacobite units disband
- 20 September Prince departs for France from Loch nan Uamh

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